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Coping with a cancer diagnosis is known to be a stressful experience that can be related 
to declines in personal well-being and increases in distress. Dispositional mindfulness is 
known to be related to depressive symptoms and well-being. The primary purpose of this 
study was to examine the relationship between mindfulness and experiences of 
depressive symptoms and well-being in people recently diagnosed with cancer. Seventy-
four participants who were diagnosed with cancer in the last 12 months completed an 
initial self-report survey, and 43 of those completed another survey 3 months later. Cross-
sectional regression analysis showed that higher levels of mindfulness were related to 
  
fewer depressive symptoms, less use of avoidant coping, and more experiences of 
positive affect at baseline, but not related to positive reappraisal coping at baseline. 
Longitudinal regression analyses showed no significant relationship between mindfulness 
at baseline and depressive symptoms, experiences of positive affect, positive reappraisal 
coping, or avoidant coping 3 months later, after controlling for the dependent variable at 
baseline. Additionally, cross-lagged analysis indicated no evidence of a causal 
relationship between mindfulness at baseline and the dependent variables 3 months later.  
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Dispositional Mindfulness in People Diagnosed with Cancer: The Relationship to 
Depressive Symptoms and Well-Being 
 
 With the advancement of effective treatments for cancer, more and more people 
are living long past their diagnoses and, therefore, living with the physical and emotional 
consequences of cancer and its treatment. Despite improved effectiveness, cancer 
treatments are still routinely highly stressful, frightening, and painful. The stress of these 
treatments, added to the existential stress of facing possible death when diagnosed with 
cancer, are likely to impact the psychological well-being of people living long after their 
cancer treatments. Stressful life events, such as cancer diagnosis, are known to be related 
to increased depressive symptoms and fewer positive life experiences (McDaniel, 
Musselman, Porter, Reed, & Nemeroff, 1995). With many more people living far beyond 
a cancer diagnosis, examination of the factors that lead to and protect people from 
psychological declines has become more important. 
 In the last 20 years, mindfulness, a state of being aware of what is happening in 
the moment without judgment, has emerged as an individual factor known to be related to 
psychological well-being—an idea backed up by an growing body of research. Long a 
goal of Buddhist meditative traditions, the experience of mindfulness is characterized by 
feeling a greater-that-usual sense of wakefulness and clarity (Langer & Moldoveanu, 
2000a) and an especially vivid experience of perceiving phenomena happening both 
internally and externally in the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Mindfulness, 
which is theorized to be made up of both self-reflective attention and judgment-free 
experience of stimuli, is likely related to psychological well-being by improving an 
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individual‘s ability to choose what phenomena are paid attention to and control emotional 
reactions (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007b). 
 Mindfulness can be developed in a number of ways, including the contemplative 
traditions of many world religions. Its intentional cultivation was first used as a modern 
technique for the promotion of good mental health by Jon Kabat-Zinn who designed and 
popularized a training protocol called Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; 
Kabat-Zinn, 1990). This 8-week mindfulness development program has been widely 
replicated and studied; empirical research has shown a consistent relationship between 
the training and reduced stress and improved well-being, including reduction of 
depressive symptoms (e.g., Carlson & Garland, 2005; Garland, Carlson, Cook, Lansdell, 
& Speca, 2007; Teasdale et al., 2000). In particular, programs like MBSR have been 
associated with decreased indicators of psychological disturbance among people 
diagnosed with cancer (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
 However, researchers, including Brown and Ryan (2003), theorized that 
mindfulness is a useful theoretical concept related to psychological well-being even when 
it is not directly induced through training. To demonstrate this, Brown and Ryan 
developed a measure of ―dispositional mindfulness‖ called the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale (MAAS). Further research has shown that scores on this measure went 
up through mindfulness training and that scores were negatively correlated with levels of 
depressive symptoms and positively correlated with measures of psychological well-
being (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
 The present study aims to examine the relationship between dispositional 
mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, and depressive symptoms, positive reappraisal 
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coping, and positive mind states among people recently diagnosed with cancer. To do so, 
people with a cancer diagnosis will be surveyed on these factors within 12 months of 
diagnosis and, again, 3 months later. It is hypothesized that scores on the MAAS will be 
negatively associated with depressive symptoms and positively associated with positive 
reappraisal coping and frequency of experiencing positive states of mind at the first 
measurement. Also, it is hypothesized that scores on the MAAS at the first survey will be 
negatively associated with depressive symptoms and positively associated with positive 
reappraisal coping and frequency of experiencing positive states of mind 3 months later. 
 
Literature Review 
 According to estimates from the National Cancer Institute, 11.4 million 
Americans who had been diagnosed with cancer were alive in January of 2006 (American 
Cancer Society, 2010). Cancer takes the lives of about 1,500 people a day, more than half 
a million a year, and accounts for one out of every four deaths in the U.S. (American 
Cancer Society, 2009). Despite still being a prominent cause of death, 5-year survival 
rates for people diagnosed with cancer are improving; the 5-year survival rate was 66% 
between 1996 and 2003, up from 50% between 1975 and 1977 (American Cancer 
Society, 2009). With so many people surviving long past their diagnoses and cancer 
treatments, issues of quality of life during and after cancer treatment have become 
especially salient.  
 Within the general population of people living long beyond their cancer diagnosis, 
are a diverse group of survivors with different types and stages of cancer and, potentially, 
vastly different experiences of treatment and coping. For example, 200,000 women are 
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diagnosed with breast cancer annually, and the 5-year survival rate for all types of breast 
cancer is 90% (American Cancer Society, 2010). About 100,000 people are diagnosed 
with colon cancer annually and about 40,000 are diagnosed with rectal cancer annually, 
and the 5-year survival rate for all types of colorectal cancer is 65% (American Cancer 
Society, 2010). About 58,000 new cases of kidney cancer are diagnosed annually and the 
5-year survival rate is 68% (American Cancer Society, 2010). About 24,000 people are 
diagnosed with liver cancer annually, and face a 5-year survival rate of 26% (American 
Cancer Society, 2010). And about 220,000 people are diagnosed with lung cancer 
annually, and the 5-year survival rate for all lung cancers is 16%, but those who are 
diagnosed early can expect a 53% 5-year survival rate (American Cancer Society, 2010). 
Similarly, demographic variables such as gender, age, and socioeconomic status further 
diversify the experiences of people diagnosed with cancer.   
 Almost everything associated with cancer diagnosis can be considered stressful, 
even traumatic, for individuals. First, people diagnosed with cancer are forced to consider 
the worst outcomes from the disease including significant physical impairment and 
possible mortality. Then, individuals are required to take in a great deal of sophisticated 
medical and health related information about their disease and treatment options, and 
subsequently make complicated decisions about potentially expensive, unreliable, 
painful, and frightening procedures and treatments. People diagnosed with cancer are 
likely to choose some form of treatment that may include any combination of surgery, 
radiation, chemotherapy, and hormone therapy. Treatment itself can be painful, 
strenuous, and chaotic, and can cause side effects including radiation burns, constipation, 
diarrhea, nausea, and vomiting, hair loss, bleeding, fatigue, and sexual problems. These 
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experiences of treatment vary based on type and stage of cancer, so there is a diverse 
range of treatment experiences. In addition to physical symptoms, the process of going 
through cancer treatment can be stressful in a number of other dimensions: it can cause 
conflicts and relationship stress among family members, financial problems, and 
occupational problems (American Cancer Society, 2009). Similarly, demographic factors 
including gender, ethnicity, family income, employment status, level of education, and 
relationship status have been shown to relate to stress experiences following cancer 
diagnosis (American Cancer Society). Finally, once diagnosed and treated for cancer, 
individuals are at a much greater risk for recurrence than the general public, and must 
deal with fears of becoming ill again. 
 All of these stressors have the potential to lead people diagnosed with cancer to a 
negative affect and lowered quality of life, as well as depressive symptoms. However, 
some people who have been diagnosed with cancer also have positive emotional 
experiences including increased frequency of positive mood states and positive 
reappraisal of difficult situations. 
Depressive Symptoms and Cancer Diagnosis 
 Depressive symptoms are more common in populations of people with medical 
illnesses than in the general population, likely in relation to the stress associated with 
serious illness. In individuals with medical illnesses, several studies have found that 
about 25% demonstrate clinically significant depressive symptoms in any 6-month period 
(Massie, 2004), and 42% experienced depressive symptoms over a lifetime (Wells, 
Golding, & Burnam, 1988). 
 6 
 
 Among people diagnosed with cancer, it is estimated that 24% experience 
depressive symptoms (McDaniel et al., 1995). However, few studies have looked at 
depressive symptoms directly, rather than at rates of diagnosed Major Depression, or 
sufficiently isolated depressive symptoms from common symptoms of cancer treatment, 
such as fatigue. 
 Regardless of cause or treatment, the combination of depression and cancer 
diagnosis has been shown to have negative correlations with health outcomes, including 
survivorship rates. People diagnosed with cancer who are depressed tend to have lower 
quality of life, are less compliant with treatment, and experience longer hospital stays 
(Newport & Nemeroff, 1998). They also experience more pain than people diagnosed 
with cancer who are not depressed, and greater functional impairment (Mossey & 
Gallagher, 2004). To establish evidence that people diagnosed with cancer who also have 
depression experience an increased risk of death from all causes, Onitilo, Nietert, and 
Egede (2006) established baseline data in 1982 from more than 10,000 people, tracking 
their depression, with the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; 
Radloff, 1977), and cancer diagnosis. Eight or more years later, culminating in 1992, the 
researchers tracked the participants‘ mortality and compared groups defined by their 
depression and cancer statuses (depression but no cancer, cancer but not depression, 
neither cancer nor depression, and both cancer and depression). The people with both 
cancer and depression had a 19% increased risk of death from all causes compared with 
people with cancer only, a 24% increased risk compared with people with depression 
only, and a 70% increased risk of death compared with people with neither cancer nor 
depression. 
 7 
 
Declines in Positive States Associated with Depressive Symptoms 
 Another way to conceptualize psychological distress in people diagnosed with 
cancer, other than looking at depressive symptoms, is through assessment of the presence 
or absence positive and negative affect. Negative affect has been found to be related to 
both anxiety and depression, and the absence of positive affect is strongly related to 
depression (Voogt et al., 2004). In particular, depressive symptoms in people diagnosed 
with cancer have been found to be more strongly related to lower levels of positive 
feelings, as compared to a healthy population, while the relationship between negative 
feelings and depressive symptoms was similar (Ritterband & Spielberger, 2001).  
Positive Reappraisal Coping Associated with Less Distress 
 Positive reappraisal is an active coping mechanism in which an individual faces a 
negatively perceived situation and intentionally makes positive meaning of it (Garland, 
Gaylord, & Park, 2009). Evidence of positive reappraisal in people experiencing serious 
medical issues, including breast cancer and HIV, has been shown to be related to less 
psychological distress (eg., Manne et al., 2004; Moskowitz, Folkman, Collette, & 
Vittinghoff, 1996). 
Avoidant Coping Fails to Support Long-Term Well-Being 
 Avoidant coping, which includes ignoring, escaping, and distorting stimuli, is 
conceptualized as a way of dealing with problems by pulling attention away from them 
(Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan, 2009). The relief of stress experienced through avoidant 
coping is short-lived in contrast with approach coping, in which problem-solving and 
reinterpretation feature prominently. Because stress relief from avoidant coping is not 
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long-term, it is thought to be ineffective in supporting future well-being (Davies & Clark, 
1998). 
Mindfulness Defined 
 For the purposes of this thesis, mindfulness is defined as ―the state of being 
attentive to and aware of what is taking place in the present,‖ as established by Brown 
and Ryan in 2003 (p. 822). Mindfulness can be viewed in a variety of ways and has its 
roots in several spiritual traditions, most prominently, Buddhism (Brown et al., 2007b), 
but it is also, simply, the familiar experience of consciously experiencing being human. 
 The awareness component of mindfulness refers to conscious registration of 
stimuli, including the five senses, body awareness, cognitions, and emotions. Attention is 
paid to stimuli when they are notable (Brown et al., 2007b). Though conceptually simple, 
mindfulness is essential to positive experiences and behaviors. Mindfulness can be rare 
and challenging to attain because of the rapid, ongoing cognitive processes that distract 
from awareness of stimuli; inputs are quickly appraised using existing heuristics, 
associated with previous experiences, and assimilated into existing cognitive processes 
(Brown et al.). To be mindful, one must simply register facts observed through stimuli, 
rather than analyze them. In fact, the normal psychological reactions to stimuli are to be 
noticed as well, as part of the ongoing stream of consciousness. The absence of critical 
thoughts allows persons to be ―present‖ to their experiences, and engage in objectively 
chosen thoughts and behaviors. 
 Brown, Ryan, and Creswell (2007a) identified several, overlapping characteristics 
of mindfulness useful for conceptual understanding as well as empirical study. Clarity of 
awareness describes the mirror-like reflection of reality that occurs in the mindful mind. 
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This unhindered state of attention is thought to allow access to all of an individual‘s 
psychological sources of knowledge and to create conditions favorable to clear-headed 
decision-making. Similarly, mindfulness is also characterized by nonconceptual, 
nondiscriminatory awareness, which separates experiences of stimuli from the routine 
cognitions about stimuli. A mindful state of thinking also allows for attention to be 
focused at different levels seamlessly. This flexibility of awareness and attention can 
include simultaneous focus on specific objects as well as sensing of all salient stimuli. An 
empirical stance toward reality allows judgments to be deferred until stimuli are fully 
experienced. Mindfulness includes present-oriented consciousness, with attention 
focused on in-the-moment experiences, rather than what has been or will be. All these 
characteristics are present and fundamental in all thinking beings, however, in its 
developed state, mindfulness also has a stability or continuity of attention and awareness 
that ensures that mindful states are frequent and continuous. This continuous noticing 
helps individuals move from narrow to broad focus and notice when they are not present, 
so that they may shift their awareness in a more mindful direction. Overall, mindfulness 
may be seen as an enhanced version of normative attention and awareness processes, with 
an emphasis on nonjudgment, present-moment orientation, and flexibility of scope. 
 The idea of mindfulness comes most clearly from a Buddhist tradition that argues 
for the elimination of human suffering through the cultivation of mental balance (Wallace 
& Shapiro, 2006). In Buddhism, experiences like anxiety, frustration, and depression are 
considered to be symptoms of an ―unbalanced‖ mind, which can be remedied through 
skillful and sustained mental training to cultivate attention and awareness. Spiritual 
practices in Buddhism, including meditation, form this mental training with the goal of 
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achieving a state of continuous well-being that does not depend on pleasurable stimuli 
and that avoids a judgmental mind (Wallace & Shapiro). Similar conceptualizations of 
―mental balance‖ are found in a variety of diverse intellectual and spiritual traditions, 
including ancient Greek philosophy, Western European existentialism, and American 
transcendentalism, suggesting that the cultivation of attention and awareness is a goal 
common to most spiritual and religious practices and, more generally, human experience. 
Research into Mindfulness 
 Starting in the 1980s, mindfulness has been a popular topic for scholarly research, 
clinical application, and popular media. In 1990, Kabat-Zinn described mindfulness as a 
process of bringing a certain quality of attention to moment-by-moment experience. 
Langer (1989) described the dichotomy between mindfulness and mindlessness, 
describing the latter as a state of being open to surprise, oriented in the present moment, 
sensitive to context, and liberated from habitual mindsets. Her approach, which is 
significantly different from the general thread being examine in the present work, also 
described mindfulness as the process of drawing novel distinctions (rather than relying on 
distinctions and categories drawn in the past), and said that the ―feel‖ of mindfulness is 
that of a ―heightened state of involvement and wakefulness‖ (Langer & Moldoveanu, 
2000b). 
 In keeping with the Buddhist idea that a balanced mind would result in 
elimination of suffering, it has been theorized that mindfulness is related to psychological 
health. The mechanisms for improvement in psychological health through mindfulness 
are not yet clear, but one theory argues for a direct connection; Brown and Ryan (2003) 
suggest mindfulness adds clarity and vividness to current experiences and encourages 
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closer, moment-to-moment sensory contact with life, without cognitive distortion. 
 There are a number of possible mechanisms at play in establishing the link 
between mindful attention and psychological health. Mindfulness may operate indirectly 
by improving self-regulated functioning through enhanced attentional sensitivity to 
psychological, physical, and environmental cues, referred to as reflexive self-
consciousness (Brown et al., 2007b). With greater awareness of both the internal and 
external worlds, persons are better able to make decisions about behavior in line with 
their personal goals and desires. For example, emotional regulation can improve through 
having a greater sense of reality combined with a better ability to change thoughts and 
behaviors (Coffey & Hartman, 2008). Rumination also decreases through this improved 
awareness, as do attachments to fleeting objects and outcomes (Coffey & Hartman). In 
addition to attentional sensitivity, the strength of attentional abilities may be important to 
well-being:  
People need to be attentive to their inner states and behavior to pursue reflectively 
considered goals, and failing to bring sufficient attention to oneself tends to foster 
habitual, overlearned, or automatized reactions rather than responses that are self-
endorsed and situationally appropriate. Effective functioning demands that 
attention be directed toward both inner and outer events, but there is also 
scholarly agreement that directing attention to subjective mental, emotional, and 
physical experience is key to healthy self-regulation. Indeed, the willingness to 
―look inside‖ is foundational to the development of self-knowledge from which 
regulated action proceeds. (Brown et al., p. 216) 
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The element of consciousness, when combined with attention, serves to protect the 
individual from spontaneous emotional reactions to stimuli, allowing a person to simply 
take in information without requiring judgment or future planning (Brown et al.). With 
this ability to choose simple awareness over automatic reactions in place, people are 
better able to choose related adaptive behaviors and maintain a high level of self-
awareness, both factors related to ongoing psychological health. 
Mindfulness Interventions 
 The majority of research on mindfulness has focused on interventions to enhance 
individual mindfulness which have been evaluated through outcome measures related to 
well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), 
developed by Jon Kabat-Zinn, is the best-known of these interventions and features 8 
weeks of training in voluntary deployment of attention, based on mindfulness meditation, 
and its integration into everyday life (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Numerous studies have 
demonstrated positive attitudinal, health, and behavioral changes associated with MBSR, 
including improvements in psychological and physical well-being and reductions in 
anxiety and depression (Teasdale et al., 2000). Specifically in people diagnosed with 
cancer, MBSR has been associated with diminished medical and psychological 
symptoms, including fatigue, mood disturbance, depression, anxiety, fear of recurrence, 
pain, and symptoms of stress (eg., Carlson, Speca, Faris, & Patel, 2007; Garland et al., 
2007), as well as enhanced sleep, posttraumatic growth, spirituality, energy, and quality 
of life (e.g., Garland et al., 2007; Lengacher et al., 2009). 
 Following the development of MBSR, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT) was designed specifically to help persons avoid recurrence of major depression 
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(Teasdale et al., 2000). MBCT combines aspects of MBSR with elements of Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy (CBT; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The pieces of CBT 
working into MBCT are generally not those that focus on changing thoughts, but those 
intended to change thinking about thoughts (e.g., ―I am not my thoughts‖). Like MBSR, 
MBCT has also been associated with positive changes in outcome measures related to 
well-being (Teasdale et al.). Specifically, MBCT has been shown to prevent relapse of 
major depression in people who have experienced three or more major depressive 
episodes, bringing relapse rates down from 78% to 36% (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). 
 Though MBSR and MBCT are often lumped together in research of people 
diagnosed with cancer, stand-alone MBCT in an oncology setting has been associated 
with decreased depression and anxiety symptoms, decreased distress, and improved 
quality of life (e.g., Foley, Baillie, Huxter, Price, & Sinclair, 2010). As part of the initial 
validation of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), Brown and Ryan (2003) 
assessed adults diagnosed with Stage 0, I, or II breast or prostate cancer for quality of 
life, mood states, responses to stressful situations, and mindful awareness both before and 
2 weeks after a mindfulness training intervention modeled after MBSR. In this study, 
higher levels of mindfulness were related to lower levels of both mood disturbance and 
stress at both the pre-intervention measure and 2 weeks after, and increases in 
mindfulness during the intervention predicted decreases in the indicators of psychological 
disturbance (Brown & Ryan). 
Toward an Empirical Definition of Mindfulness 
 With the successes of MBSR and MBCT demonstrated through empirical studies, 
researchers have moved toward establishing an empirical definition of mindfulness, one 
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that could be measured independently. To do so, it has become important to examine the 
relationships between mindfulness and other psychological constructs in the domains of 
cognitive abilities, personality traits, and cognitive styles (Sternberg, 2002).  
 In the area of cognitive abilities, Sternberg suggested that there is significant 
conceptual overlap between mindfulness and cognitive abilities and intelligence, but that 
mindfulness offers additional dimensions not spelled out in intelligence theory. 
Additionally, Brown and Ryan (2003) point out that mindfulness and emotional 
intelligence – explained by Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995) to 
include accurate perceptions about internal emotional states -- are similar in that they 
both involve awareness of one‘s emotions. Studies have show that the two constructs 
appear to be correlated (Brown & Ryan; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004).  
 In the area of personality traits, comparisons to aspects of the big-five personality 
traits, as described by Costa and McCrae (1992), are apt. Both openness to experience 
and conscientiousness seem related to mindfulness, but, again, mindfulness seems to add 
an additional dimension (Sternberg, 2002).  
 In the area of cognitive styles, which Sternberg defined in 1997 as ―preferred 
ways of using one‘s cognitive abilities,‖ none of the existing constructs, such as 
constricted versus flexible control, match mindfulness precisely. Sternberg argued that 
that mindfulness is likely a new, stand-alone cognitive style that deserves further 
exploration (Sternberg, 2002). Langer and Moldoveanu‘s (2000a) conception of 
mindfulness as sensitivity to novel distinctions could be seen as a cognitive style, but the 
authors prefer to see it as changeable, learnable skill, rather than a set pattern.  
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 Finally, Brown and Ryan (2003) further distinguished mindfulness from self-
awareness, or reflexive consciousness, with mindfulness offering a literal take on 
cognitive processes rather than a depiction of self. 
Development of the MAAS 
 Brown and Ryan (2003) set out to define and measure mindfulness as a 
dispositional trait that can vary both between and within persons, and is characterized by 
the presence or absence of attention to and awareness of what is occurring in the present 
moment. This ―dispositional‖ construct, which stands in contrast to other approaches to 
conceptualizing and measuring mindfulness, is the focus of the current study. To fully 
establish this construct, Brown and Ryan developed and validated the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale (MAAS), which assesses the single factor of individual difference in the 
frequency of mindful states over time (Brown & Ryan). The way this construct is 
measured, separates it from other conceptualizations of mindfulness including the 
intentional act of mindfulness, such as practice in meditation, and mindfulness as a 
cognitive style, defined by a tendency to notice thoughts as one has them. The researchers 
intentionally avoided measurement of qualities associated with a mindful state, such as 
acceptance and gratitude, instead focusing on the frequency of present-centered attention-
awareness, which they consider foundational to any mindful experience and the best way 
to establish individual differences between individuals and over time without the 
complication of affect. The 15 items that make up the MAAS all inquire about the 
absence of particular mindful experiences; the researchers chose this indirect form of 
questioning because previous studies suggested that it is easier for individuals to identify 
the absence of mindfulness than to be aware of the presence of mindfulness. Examples of 
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items include ―I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until 
some time later‖ and ―I forget a person‘s name almost as soon as I‘ve been told it for the 
first time,‖ and are rated on 6-point scale from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never) 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003, pp. 825-826).  
 The 15-item measure resulted in internal consistency (coefficient alpha) of .82 
and the expected convergent and discriminant validity correlations. The MAAS was 
positively correlated with openness to experience, emotional intelligence, subjective 
well-being (lower negative affect, higher positive affect, and satisfaction with life); and 
negatively correlated with rumination, social anxiety, and indicators of psychopathology, 
including dissociation, alexithymia, and general psychological distress (Brown & Ryan; 
Brown et al., 2007b). MAAS scores were significantly higher in persons who practiced 
mindfulness regularly, than in matched controls. And, importantly, in people diagnosed 
with cancer who completed a MBSR course, higher MAAS scores were associated with 
decreases in mood disturbance and symptoms of stress (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
 Other measures of mindfulness do exist. For example, the Freiburg Mindfulness 
Inventory (FMI; Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006) uses 
30 items to measure nonjudgmental present-moment observation and openness to 
negative experience and is designed for use with experienced meditators. Its authors 
argue that, like the MAAS, it has a single-factor structure, but the factor analyses 
suggested a somewhat unstable four-factor model (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, & Krietemeyer, 
2006). The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004) uses 39 
items to measure four elements of mindfulness: observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, and accepting with judgment. The KIMS is related to conceptualizations of 
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mindfulness common in Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT; Linehan, Armstrong, 
Suarez, Alimón, & Heard, 1991) and measures a tendency to be mindful in daily life. The 
Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale (CAMS; Hayes & Feldman, 2004) uses 12 
items to measure attention, awareness, present-focus, and acceptance/nonjudgment, but 
measures them together yielding a single total score. And finally, The Southampton 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ; Chadwick et al., 2008) uses sixteen 7-point Likert-
type scale items to assess how frequently people use a mindful approach to dealing with 
distressing thoughts and images.  
 A factor analysis of these five self-report measures and others by Baer et al.  
(2006) indicated that a multifaceted construct with five factors would be preferable to a 
single-factor measure. This finding supported the development of the Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) by Baer at al., which was assembled from the KIMS 
factor structure, as the best available measure. However, Brown, Ryan, and Creswell 
(2007a) argued that operational definitions of mindfulness are not yet settled and that the 
FFMQ fails to distinguish mindfulness from self-awareness, making the single-factor 
model more functionally stable. 
Dispositional Mindfulness Associated with Mindfulness Training 
 Given the extensive research on mindfulness interventions such as MBSR, it is 
helpful to the field to know that what is being measured by self-report mindfulness 
assessments, specifically the MAAS, actually increases in the presence of mindfulness 
training. Chambers, Lo, and Allen (2007) tested a non-clinical group of 20 novice 
meditators and 20 control participants before and after an intensive, 10-day mindfulness 
meditation retreat. The meditators increased significantly in dispositional mindfulness 
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from before the training (M = 54.35, SD = 14.27) to after the training (M = 64.50, SD = 
12.37) and the control group did not change. Similarly, Shapiro, Oman, Thoresen, Plante, 
and Flinders (2008) collected data for three groups of 15 participants, one treated with 8 
weeks of MBSR, one a control, and another treated with a mediation program called 
Eight Point Program (EPP; Easwaran, 1991). They measured MAAS scores at pretest, 
posttest, and follow-up, and, using hierarchical linear models, found increases in mindful 
attention in both treatment groups. The main effect of group on MAAS scores averaged 
about two-thirds of a SD above the control group posttest, and even more in the 8 weeks 
following treatment. The findings of increased MAAS scores with training, form an 
important link between the measurement of dispositional mindfulness and the body of 
research showing MBSR and other training protocols are associated with improvements 
in psychological functioning. In other words, because it is known that training protocols 
improve both MAAS scores and psychological functioning, it is appropriate to 
hypothesize that high MAAS scores may correlate directly with any of the effects 
attributed to training. 
Mindfulness’ Relationship to Depressive Symptoms and Well-being 
 As previously established, mindfulness training improves scores on measures of 
psychological functioning and well-being, and mindfulness training is associated with 
higher MAAS scores. Because the dispositional assessment of mindfulness is still 
relatively new, there is a small -- but growing -- body of literature directly linking MAAS 
scores to scores on measures of well-being, without participant training in mindfulness.  
 Zvolensky et al. (2006) administered the MAAS, a measure of mood and anxiety 
symptoms, a measure of perceptions of personal health status, and a positive and negative 
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affect scale to 170 young adults. The MAAS was found to be positively associated with 
positive affectivity, perceived general health, and mental functioning, and negatively 
associated with negative affectivity, anxious arousal, and depressive symptoms. Through 
hierarchical linear regression, the researchers found the MAAS predicted a significant 
amount of variance in symptoms of depression, with higher scores on the MAAS 
predicting fewer depressive symptoms. However, higher scores on the MAAS did not 
significantly predict anxious arousal (Zvolensky et al., 2006). The researchers also found 
that greater levels of mindfulness were associated with improved perceptions of physical 
health status, lower perceived impact of health on physical functioning, and lower 
perceived impact of health status on the quality of mental functioning (Zvolensky et al., 
2006). Importantly, this research is consistent with theories about depressive vulnerability 
being related to mindfulness. 
 In a 2007 study by Argus and Thompson, 141 clinically depressed inpatients were 
measured for mindfulness level (MAAS), problem-solving ability, adaptive and 
maladaptive perfectionism, and depression severity. The negative association between 
problem-solving ability and depression severity was mediated by mindfulness score, as 
was the positive relationship between maladaptive perfectionism and depression severity. 
Furthermore, among the measures, mindfulness contributed the greatest amount of 
variance to overall depressive symptom severity (Argus & Thompson, 2007). 
 In a 2010 study of 365 undergraduate students, Christopher and Gilbert measured 
mindfulness on the MAAS and KIMS scales, depressive symptoms, depressive 
cognitions, self-esteem, and satisfaction with life. The incremental validity of the KIMS 
and MAAS relative to self-esteem in the prediction of satisfaction with life and relative to 
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negative cognitions in the prediction of depressive symptoms was tested using 
hierarchical linear regression models (Christopher & Gilbert). Only the positive 
association between ―observe‖ factor from the KIMS accounted for a significant amount 
of the variance relative to self-esteem in predicting increased satisfaction with life, and 
only the negative association with the ―accept without judgment‖ factor from the KIMS 
accounted for a significant amount of variance relative to negative cognitions in 
predicting increased depressive symptoms (Christopher & Gilbert). Therefore, the MAAS 
and most of the KIMS factors did not appear in this study to contribute unique variance in 
satisfaction with life and depressive symptoms.  
 Similarly, a 2007 study of young adults showed negative associations between the 
―accept‖ factor on the KIMS and emotional vulnerabilities, such as negative affectivity 
and anxiety sensitivity (McKee, Zvolensky, Solomon, Bernstein, & Leen-Feldner, 2007). 
In another study concerning both anxiety sensitivity and mindfulness, Vujanovic, 
Zvolensky, Bernstein, Feldner, and McLeish (2007) found similar negative associations 
between the MAAS and anxiety sensitivity, anxious arousal, anhedonic depressive 
symptoms, and agoraphobic cognitions. Additionally, the researchers found that the 
combined effect of lowered anxiety sensitivity and high MAAS scores significantly 
predicted anxious arousal and agoraphobic cognitions (Vujanovic et al.).  
 In another study using both the MAAS and the KIMS, researchers looked at 
associations between mindfulness and responses to negative automatic thoughts in both a 
non-clinical student population and a treatment-seeking student sample (Frewen, Evans, 
Maraj, Dozois, & Partridge, 2008). In a the non-clinical sample of 64 undergraduates, 
both measures of dispositional mindfulness (MAAS and KIMS) were negatively 
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correlated with negative thought frequency and positively correlated with perceptions of 
the ability to let go of negative thoughts. In the treatment-seeking sample of 43 
undergraduates who had enrolled in a mindfulness group modeled on MBSR and MBCT, 
the treatment was also shown to be associated with decreases in both frequency and 
perceptions of difficulty in letting go of negative automatic thoughts (Frewen et al., 
2008). 
 Gonzalez, Solomon, Zvolensky, and Miller (2009) measured disengagement 
coping, mindful attention, and anxiety and depressive symptoms in 98 adults who self-
reported having an HIV or AIDS diagnosis. Disengagement coping is a way of dealing 
with stressful life events by withdrawing physically, emotionally, or cognitively from an 
unpleasant stressor; it may reduce affective discomfort in the short run, but can also yield 
longer-term negative emotional effects (Gonzalez et al.). The researchers found a 
significant interaction between mindful attention and disengagement coping in predicting 
anxiety symptoms, with higher levels of disengagement coping and lower levels of 
mindful attention associated with the highest rates of anxiety, and lower levels of 
disengagement and higher levels of mindful awareness associated with the lowest levels 
of anxiety symptoms (Gonzalez et al.). 
 Many of the features of mindfulness line up with aspects of positive reappraisal, 
which is an intentional switch away from focusing on a situation as negative and a 
construction of more adaptive way of viewing life events (Garland et al., 2009). The 
process of stepping away from experiencing the emotive content of thoughts, and rather 
examining them through a metacognitive stance – thinking about thinking -- is a hallmark 
of mindfulness, as well as a central feature of reappraisal. In their 2009 article on the 
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theoretical similarities between mindfulness and positive reappraisal, Garland et al. 
suggest that, in fact, ―mindful decentering allows for the possibility of reappraisal‖ (p. 
39). A pilot study by Garland et al. indicates that training in mindfulness is related to 
greater positive reappraisal.  
 Weinstein, Brown, and Ryan (2009) also examined the relationship between 
mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, and coping, as well as both stress levels and 
well-being in college students. In four separate studies, the researchers found that more 
mindful individuals were less likely to use avoidant coping strategies. Additionally, in 
two of the four studies, higher levels of mindfulness were related to greater use of 
approach coping, which included positive reappraisal coping (Weinstein et al., 2009).  
 With this body of research substantially emerging, clear, empirical connections 
between dispositional mindfulness and well-being are forming. The developing body of 
literature further validates the MAAS and adds credence to arguments that the presence 
of a mindful disposition is related to fewer depressive symptoms, increased experiences 
of positive states of mind, and increased experiences of positive reappraisal coping upon 
the occasion of a stressful life event.  
Summary and Statement of the Problem 
 It is widely accepted in cancer literature that the experience of diagnosis and 
treatment for a cancer is highly stressful and can result in negative psychological effects. 
Specifically, people recently diagnosed with cancer are at risk of experiencing less well-
being and positive affect than those who do not have a cancer diagnosis. 
 Studies about dispositional mindfulness, as well as interventions to teach 
mindfulness, have shown that a high level of mindful attention and awareness is often 
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associated with better outcomes on measures of psychological distress. This is true in the 
general population and with clinical mental health populations, as well as for people who 
are facing serious medical diagnoses. However, few specifics are available in the 
literature about the effects of mindfulness on distress in people diagnosed with cancer. 
 It is hypothesized that individual differences in levels of mindful attention in 
people recently diagnosed with cancer will be related to individual differences in levels 
of depressive symptoms, positive states of mind, positive reappraisal coping, and 
avoidant coping. The present study has the potential to highlight the inverse relationship 
between mindfulness and negative mental health outcomes, and the positive relationship 
between mindfulness and positive outcomes. With mindfulness theorized to be related to 
greater ability to attend to stimuli in a manner consistent with well-being, there exists the 
possibility that people recently diagnosed with cancer are functionally protected from 
mental health deterioration by higher levels of dispositional mindfulness. Though this 
relationship has been previously examined through interventions that increase 
mindfulness, the present study adds a new element to the literature by relating 
dispositional mindfulness, uncoupled with an intervention, to the well-being of people 
diagnosed with cancer. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were a convenience sample of adults diagnosed with cancer in the 12-
month period prior to study recruitment.  All types of cancer diagnoses made individuals 
eligible to participate in the study, with the exception of non-melanoma skin cancer and 
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cancer which is likely to cause fatality within the study‘s follow-up period. Non-
melanoma skin cancer rarely spreads to other parts of the body (American Cancer 
Society, 2009) and requires a less invasive treatment protocol than other cancers, which 
results in a significantly different emotional and physical experience for people with that 
specific diagnosis. Similarly, persons with cancer who would likely die within 6 months 
have significantly different experiences than those who hope to be cured through 
treatment. Participants were required to provide informed consent, read English text, and 
be at least 18 years old. 
 Demographic information is presented in Table 1 for the sample at Time 1 (N = 
74). The mean age of participants was 52.8 years (SD = 12). The majority of participants 
were female (n = 56, 75.7%). A total of 17 men participated in the study (23.9%). One 
participant (1.4%) did not answer the question about gender. There were 44 participants 
who identified themselves as Caucasian (59.5%), 23 who identified themselves as 
African American (31.1%), 1 who identified her or himself as Asian Pacific Islander 
(1.4%), and 1 who identified as bi-racial (1.4%). Five participants did not report their 
ethnicities. Of the participants, 27 (36.5%) reported their highest level of education as 
graduation from high school or attainment of a General Educational Development (GED) 
credential, 17 (23.0%) reported having had some college coursework, and 15 (20.3%) 
reported that they had graduated from college. The majority of the sample reported being 
married (n = 39, 52.7%) or partnered (n = 10, 13.5%). Thirty of the participants reported 
not being employed (42.3%), 18 (24.3%) were employed full-time, 11 (14.9%) were 
employed part-time, and 13 (17.6%) were retired. Twenty-eight participants reported 
their household income to be under $20,000 a year (37.8%), 11 (14.9%) reported making 
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between $20,001 and $40,000 annually and 11 (14.9%) reported income between 
$40,001 and $60,000.  
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants at Time 1 
 
 
Variable         Number of Participants             Percent 
 
Racial/Ethnic Background   
      Caucasian (White) 44 59.5 
      African American (Black) 23 31.1 
      Asian/Pacific Islander  1 1.4 
      Bi-racial 1 1.4 
      Missing 5 6.8 
    
Age   
      20 to 29 4 5.4 
      30 to 39 5 6.8 
      40 to 49 22 29.7 
      50 to 59 17 23.0 
      60 to 69 17 23.0 
      70 to 79 3 4.1 
      80 to 89 1 1.4 
      Missing 5 6.8 
   
Sex              
      Female 56 75.7 
      Male 17 23.0 
      Missing  1 1.4 
   
Highest Level of Education     
      Elementary or Middle 1 1.4 
      Some High School 6 8.1 
      High School Graduate or GED 27 36.5 
      Some College 17 23.0 
      College Graduate 15 20.3 
      Some Graduate School 2 2.7 
      Graduate/Professional Degree 4 5.4 
      Other 1 1.4 
      Missing 1 1.4 
 
(table continues) 
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Table 1 (continued).  
 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants at Time 1 
 
 
Variable         Number of Participants             Percent 
 
Relationship Status   
      Married 39 52.7 
      Partnered  10 13.5 
      Separated 1 1.4 
      Divorced 9 12.2 
      Widowed 3 4.1 
      Single 11 14.9 
      Missing 1 1.4 
   
Employment   
      Not Employed 30 40.5 
      Full-time 18 24.3 
      Part-time 11 14.9 
      Retired 13 17.6 
      Missing 1 1.4 
   
Annual Household Income   
      Less than $20,000 28 37.8 
      $20,001-40,000 11 14.9 
      $40,001-60,000 11 14.9 
      $60,001-80,000 5 6.8 
      $80,001-100,000 12 16.2 
      Greater than $100,000 6 8.1 
      Missing 1 1.4 
 
 
 Information about the illness characteristics of participants at Time 1 is presented 
in Table 2. Of the types of cancer participants had been diagnosed with, breast cancer 
occurred most frequently (n = 34, 45.9%), followed by lung cancer (n = 7, 9.5%), and 
colon/rectal cancer (n = 5, 6.8%). Nine participants reported having a diagnosis of a 
Stage I cancer (12.2%), 18 reported Stage II (24.3%), 17 reported Stage III (23.0%), 7 
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reported Stage IV (9.5%), 17 reported that they did not know their stage (23.0%), and 6 
did not report their stage (8.1%). The majority of participants (n = 57, 77%) were actively 
in treatment when they completed the Time 1 survey. Most participants had some 
combination of three types of treatment, chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery; 27 had all 
three (36.5%), 13 had chemotherapy and radiation (17.6%), and 10 had surgery and 
radiation (13.5%). The average time passed since diagnosis, as measured at completion of 
the Time 1 survey packet, was 6.2 months (SD = 4.7). 
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Table 2   
 
Illness Characteristics of Participants at Time 1 
 
 
Variable             Number of Participants             Percentage  
 
Cancer Types   
      Breast 34 45.9 
      Lung 7 9.5 
      Colon/Rectal 5 6.8 
      Throat 4 5.4 
      Ovarian 4 5.4 
      Multiple Myeloma (Blood Cancer) 3 4.1 
      Cervical 2 2.7 
      Uterine 2 2.7 
      Oral 1 1.4 
      Peritoneal 1 1.4 
      Vulvar 1 1.4 
      Melanoma 1 1.4 
      Sarcoma 1 1.4 
      Missing 8 10.8 
   
Stage of Disease   
      Stage I 9 12.2 
      Stage II 18 24.3 
      Stage III 17 23.0 
      Stage IV 7 9.5 
      Uncertain 17 23.0 
      Missing 6 8.1 
   
Treatment Status   
      Finished 11 14.9 
      Unfinished 57 77.0 
      Uncertain 1 1.4 
      Missing 5 6.8 
 
(table continues) 
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Table 2 (continued).   
 
Illness Characteristics of Participants at Time 1 
 
 
Variable             Number of Participants             Percentage  
 
Treatment Type   
      Surgery 3 4.1 
      Chemotherapy 6 8.1 
      Radiation 3 4.1 
      Surgery and Chemotherapy 5 6.8 
      Surgery and Radiation 10 13.5 
      Chemotherapy and Radiation 13 17.6 
      Surgery, Chemotherapy, and 
 Radiation 
 
27 
 
36.5 
      Missing 7 9.5 
 
 
 Of the 74 participants who completed the survey at Time 1, 43 also returned the 
survey at Time 2, which was sent out about 3 months later. The attrition rate between 
Time 1 and Time 2 is 41.9%. 
 The group of participants that completed Time 2 surveys was compared with the 
group of participants who did not complete Time 2 surveys to identify any significant 
differences in demographic factors, illness factors, or scale scores. As described below, 
no significant differences were found between the groups. 
 T tests were conducted to determine if there was a significant difference between 
participants who completed Time 2 surveys and those who did not in age or time since 
diagnosis. There was no significant difference between Time 2 completers (M = 53.12, 
SD = 12.56) and those who did not complete Time 2 (M = 52.45, SD = 13.04) in age, t 
(67) = .22, p = .83, and there was no significant difference between Time 2 completers 
(M = 6.00, SD = 4.44) and those who did not complete Time 2 (M = 6.58, SD = 5.23) in 
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time since diagnosis, t (64) = -.48, p = .63. Chi-squared analysis was used to determine if 
there was a significant difference between participants who completed Time 2 surveys 
and those who did not in gender, ethnicity, or stage of cancer at diagnosis. There was no 
significant difference between Time 2 completers and those who did not complete Time 2 
in gender, 2 (1, N = 73) = .00, p = .99; ethnicity (White or non-White), 2 (1, N = 69) = 
.07, p = .80; or stage of disease, 2 (3, N = 68) = 5.79, p = .22. 
 T tests were conducted to determine if there were significant differences between 
participants who completed Time 2 surveys and participants who did not complete Time 
2 surveys on scale scores calculated from responses on Time 1 surveys. There was no 
significant difference between Time 2 completers (M = 4.62, SD = 1.06) and those who 
did not complete Time 2 (M = 4.40, SD = 1.05) on mindfulness at Time 1, t (72) = .26, p 
= .80; no significant difference between Time 2 completers (M = 17.81, SD = 11.69) and 
those who did not complete Time 2 (M = 19.47, SD = 11.83) on depressive symptoms at 
Time 1, t (72) = -.60, p = .55; no significant difference between Time 2 completers (M = 
12.88, SD = 4.36) and those who did not complete Time 2 (M = 13.94, SD = 3.36) on 
positive states of mind at Time 1, t (71) = -1.12, p = .27; no significant difference 
between Time 2 completers (M = 12.93, SD = 2.54) and those who did not complete 
Time 2 (M = 12.45, SD = 2.74) on positive reappraisal coping at Time 1, t (71) = .77, p = 
.45; and no significant difference between Time 2 completers (M = 12.00, SD = 3.46) and 
those who did not complete Time 2 (M = 11.77, SD = 4.39) on avoidant coping at Time 
1, t (72) = .50, p = .62. 
Procedure 
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 Recruitment was conducted at the Massey Cancer Center (MCC) located within 
Virginia Commonwealth University‘s Health System. MCC medical staff informed 
patients about their eligibility for the study and referred them to on-site study staff who 
provided additional information, obtained informed consent, and asked participants to 
complete the questionnaire packet and return it by mail. The MCC Protocol Review and 
Monitoring System and the Virginia Commonwealth University Institutional Review 
Board approved this method of recruitment of participants.  
 The questionnaire packet contained instructions, a postage-paid envelope, a form 
for information about where researchers should send a $10 retail gift card as a ―thank 
you‖ for participation, and 12 research measures including measures of depressive 
symptoms, positive affect, positive reappraisal, and mindfulness, and a demographic and 
illness variables questionnaire. Packets for Time 1 were given to participants at the time 
of recruitment and packets for Time 2 were sent to participant homes three months later. 
Packet completion time was estimated to be about 45-60 minutes, based on a 
volunteer sample (mean age = 71.79 years, SD = 1.24). Participants were asked to 
complete the packet at three time points: Time 1, immediately following recruitment; 
Time 2, 3 months after first packet completion; and Time 3, 6 months after first packet 
completion – a measurement schedule previously used by Carver et al. (1993) in a study 
demonstrating that coping mediates the association between optimism and distress in 
women recently diagnosed with cancer. The present study examined only Time 1 and 
Time 2 data. 
Measures 
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 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003; see Appendix A.) 
The MAAS assesses individual differences in the frequency of mindful states over time, 
or the presence or absence of attention to what is occurring in the present moment 
(Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
 The scale consists of 15 items that ask participants to rate experiences of being 
mindful or mindless on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never) 
and covers cognitive, emotional, physical, interpersonal, and general domains (Brown & 
Ryan, 2003). The sum of the 15 items is reported as the total score, ranging from 15 to 
90, and higher scores indicate greater mindfulness. Although Brown and Ryan reported 
MAAS results using a mean score, other researchers have reported MAAS results using 
summed scores (e.g., Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2007, Masuda, Price, & Latzman, 2011, 
Stanley et al., 2006). 
 The exploratory factor analysis conducted by Brown and Ryan (2003) revealed a 
single factor – mindfulness – is measured by the MAAS. The measure demonstrated good 
internal consistency for the scale in both a student sample (alphas > .80) and a sample of 
adults ages 18 to 77 years (alpha = .87). This analysis also demonstrated good temporal 
stability (alphas > .80) over a time interval of 4 weeks. 
Brown and Ryan also established validity in the original study by demonstrating 
favorable comparisons between the MAAS and other scales that aimed to measure the 
likelihood of being aware of internal and external experiences. Additionally, the MAAS 
and scales correlated to measures of well-being, as hypothesized by the authors because 
of the known relationship between mindfulness and behavioral regulation, long 
associated with good mental health and well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
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After the initial scale development analysis, Carlson and Brown (2005) examined 
the reliability of the MAAS in a sample of people with a cancer diagnosis and again 
found good internal consistency (alpha = .87). They also found that higher MAAS scores 
in this sample were associated with indicators of well-being. 
In the current study, the MAAS also showed good internal consistency at both 
Time 1 (alpha = .93) and Time 2 (alpha = .89). Internal consistency reliability estimates 
for scales and subscales are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 
 
Internal Consistency Reliability Estimates for Scales and Subscales 
 
 
Instrument                                                                                              Alpha 
 
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS)  
       Time 1 .93 
       Time 2 .89 
  
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
(CES-D) 
 
       Time 1 .91 
       Time 2 .90 
  
Positive States of Mind (PSOM)  
       Time 1 .84 
       Time 2 .90 
  
Positive Reappraisal Coping (PRC)  
       Time 1 .68 
       Time 2 .75 
  
Avoidant Coping  
       Time 1 .64 
       Time 2 .80 
 
Note. Due to missing data, N ranged from 71 to 74 at Time 1 and 40 to 43 at Time 2. 
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Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977; see 
Appendix B). The CES-D assesses the presence or absence of depressive symptoms in a 
non-clinical population. 
The scale consists of 20 items which are rated on a 4-point scale, with options 0 
through 3 indicating the frequency of symptoms experienced over the preceding week. 
The ratings are summed for a total of up to 60 points and higher scores indicate a greater 
number of depressive symptom experiences. 
 Further analyses conducted by Radloff (1977) demonstrated good internal 
consistency for the scale in a sample of community adults (alpha = .85) and in a clinical 
sample (alpha = .90). 
 Studies of the reliability of the CES-D in persons with cancer have consistently 
shown high alphas (> .85) (Beeber, Shea, & McCorkle, 1998; Hann, Winter, & Jacobsen, 
1999). Temporal stability of the CES-D in people diagnosed with cancer was shown to be 
moderate (between r = .45 and r = .70), in a time interval ranging from 3 to 12 months, 
by Hann et al. Construct validity for the CES-D in people diagnosed with cancer has been 
demonstrated in studies that consistently show greater experiences of depressive 
symptoms in people with cancer than in matched samples of healthy controls (Beeber et 
al., 1998; Hann et al., 1999) and in studies that show significant positive correlations with 
indicators of physical discomfort and poor psychological functioning (Beeber et al., 
1998; Hann et al., 1999). 
 In the current study, the CES-D also showed good internal consistency at both 
Time 1 (alpha = .91) and Time 2 (alpha = .90). 
 36 
 
 Positive States of Mind (Horowitz et al., 1988; see Appendix C). The PSOM 
measures the ability of individuals to enter positive moods (focused attention, 
productivity, responsible caretaking, restful repose, sensuous pleasure, and sharing). The 
scale consists of 6 items rated on a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 (unable to have it) to 3 
(have it well), and relates to moods experienced during the preceding week. Each item 
can represent a separate scale, but for the purposes of this study will be summed for a 
total indication of ability to enter positive states of mind, with higher scores indicating 
higher ability to enter positive states of mind. 
 The initial validation conducted by Horowitz et al. (1988) demonstrated good 
internal consistency for the scale in a sample of college students (alpha = .77).  Similar 
alphas have been reported in subsequent studies (e.g., Adler et al., 1998, Folkman, 1997).  
Convergent validity has been shown through an inverse relationship between the PSOM 
and the CES-D (Folkman), an inverse relationship between PSOM and the set of Profile 
of Mood States scales that measure negative symptomology (Tension-Anxiety, Anger-
Hostility, Fatigue-Inertia, Depression-Dejection, Confusion-Bewilderment), and a 
positive relationship between PSOM and the Vigor-Activity scale of Profile of Mood 
States (Adler et al.). 
 In the current study, the PSOM also showed good internal consistency at both 
Time 1 (alpha = .84) and Time 2 (alpha = .90). 
 Positive Reappraisal Coping (Carver et al., 1989; see Appendix D). The positive 
reappraisal subscale of the COPE (Carver et al.) was conceived to measure coping that is 
focused on the management of negative emotions rather than on the primary stressor. 
However, it is also applicable to considering how an individual conceptualizes a negative 
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event and how he or she is able to problem-solve through the stress (Carver et al.). The 
positive reappraisal subscale is a 4-item self-report inventory that taps into one of 15 
different coping strategies assessed by the overall, 60-item COPE. The 4 items are 
answered on a response scale of 1 (I don’t do this at all) to 4 (I do this a lot), which in 
this case participants are asked to relate to their experiences with cancer. The sum of the 
items may range from 4 to 16, with higher scores indicating great use of positive 
reappraisal coping. Although Carver et al. calculated the score by summing the responses 
for each item, some researchers in subsequent studies have reported scores as the mean of 
the items (e.g., Sears, Stanton, & Danoff-Burg, 2003; Manne et al., 2004). For the 
purposes of the present study, the summed scores was used. 
 The initial validation conducted by Carver et al. (1989) demonstrated good 
internal consistency for the scale (alpha = .74) with a general sample. In people with 
cancer, internal consistency has ranged from .77 (Sears et al., 2003) to .82 (Manne et al., 
2004).  
 Construct validity has been shown through a positive correlations with positive 
affect and negative correlations with negative affect (Clark, Bormann, Cropanzano, & 
James, 1995). 
 In the current study, internal consistency for the positive reappraisal subscale of 
the COPE was .68 at Time 1 and .75 at Time 2. 
 Avoidant coping subscale of the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997; see Appendix D). 
The Brief COPE, like the full COPE (Carver et al., 1989), was designed to evaluate 
coping responses at times of stress. With mindfulness theoretically related to the 
frequency of attending to internal and external stimuli, we chose to assess the extent to 
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which participants used coping strategies which helped them to disengage from stressors. 
To do so, we used three subscales from the Brief COPE: Self-Distraction, which was 
called ―mental disengagement‖ in the original COPE and entails choosing cognitive 
activities like work to avoid thinking about a stressor; Behavioral Disengagement, which 
entails ―giving up‖ on attempts to cope; and Denial, which includes active attempts to tell 
oneself a stressor does not exist. Each subscale is made up of two items answered on a 
response scale of 0 (I haven’t been doing this at all) to 3 (I’ve been doing this a lot) 
(Carver). The sum of these six items may range from 0 to 18, with higher scores 
indicating greater use of avoidant coping. In Carver‘s original validation of the full 
COPE, the three subscales loaded onto a single factor in the second-order factor analysis, 
producing an eigenvalue greater than 1.  
In the initial validation of the Brief COPE by Carver (1997), conducted on a 
sample of 168 adults who had recently been affected by a hurricane, the alpha reliability 
for the subscale Self-Distraction was .71, for Denial it was .54, and for Behavioral 
Disengagement it was .65. Importantly, researchers in a number of studies of people 
diagnosed with cancer have combined items from multiple scales of the Brief COPE. For 
example, in a 2004 study of women coping with advanced breast cancer diagnoses 
(Kershaw, et al.), higher-order exploratory factor analysis showed that avoidant subscales 
including denial (a = .74) and behavioral disengagement (a = .50), tapped into the 
COPE‘s conceptualization of avoidant coping (a = .63). Similarly, a 2002 study of breast 
cancer patients undergoing radiation therapy combined items from the original Denial 
and Behavioral Disengagement Brief COPE subscales and through factor analysis 
identified a factor called ―Disengagement‖ with internal consistency of .80 (Fillion, 
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Kovacs, Gagnon, & Endler). And a 2002 study of men undergoing biopsies for prostate 
cancer combined scales from the Brief COPE including Denial and Behavioral 
Disengagement subscales, and through factor analysis found an ―avoidant‖ factor with 
internal consistency of .55 (Perczek, Burke, Carver, Krongrad, & Terris). 
 In the current study, the avoidant subscale of the Brief COPE showed internal 
consistency of .64 at Time 1 and .80 at Time 2. 
Demographic and disease questionnaire (See Appendix E). Survey packets 
included a request for information about gender, age, race/ethnicity, level of education, 
relationship status, employment status, annual household income, and living 
arrangements. Questions were also posed to participants regarding their type of cancer, 
stage of cancer, and of the kind of cancer treatment they have undergone thus far, if any.  
 
Results 
Preliminary Data Screening 
 Prior to analysis, the data were checked for errors, missing values, and univariate 
outliers. 
Missing data. Missing data were evaluated, and if more than 20% of responses 
were missing from an individual‘s responses to a scale, that individual was excluded from 
analysis of the scale (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). If a participant failed to answer one 
item on the scale, but did not miss more than 20% of the responses on the scale, a mean 
score from the items answered was calculated and was used to impute that individual‘s 
full score for the scale.  
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Data entry errors. Data entry errors were evaluated through examination of 
descriptive statistics. Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all scales and variables 
were evaluated for appropriateness. One value, the range of scale scores for Mindfulness 
at Time 1, was found to be beyond expected parameters and a closer examination of the 
constituent data revealed an error in imputing a score. This error was fixed and no other 
parameters raised concern. Additionally, 10% of the survey packets for Time 1 (N = 7) 
and 10% of the survey packets for Time 2 (N = 4) were checked for data entry errors by 
personnel not involved in the original data entry process. No errors were found. 
Outliers. Univariate outliers were tested for variables used in hypothesis testing. 
Each score was converted into a standard score and compared against a critical value two 
standard deviations away from the mean. No participants exhibited z scores over 
established critical values on any of the scale score variables. In order to detect the 
presence of multivariate outliers, Cook‘s distance was calculated for each regression 
performed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). No multivariate outliers were detected. 
Preliminary analyses were also conducted to ensure no violations of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Normality was checked through evaluation of skewness and kurtosis statistics; for all 
scale scores skewness and kurtosis values were between -1 and 1 indicating general 
normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Linearity was checked through evaluation of 
boxplots for each pair combination of scale scores; no combinations of scores indicated a 
curvilinear relationship. Multicollinearity was checked through examination of tolerance 
statistics generated as part of collinearity diagnostics. In the analysis of both Hypothesis 5 
and Hypothesis 6, which included four predictors (dependent variable at Time 1, two 
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covariates, and the independent variable at Time 1), the tolerance statistics for the 
dependent variable at Time 1 (CESD and PSOM respectively) and the independent 
variable at Time 1 (Mindfulness) were < .64, the cutoff that indicates a problem with 
multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In both cases, the relationship between the 
dependent variable at Time 1 and the independent variable at Time 1 was relevant to the 
question featured in the hypothesis, so the variables were not combined. Further 
information about this decision is included in Chapter 5. 
Preliminary Analyses    
 Normative data. Means, standard deviations, and ranges for all measures are 
presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Scales and Subscales Used in Hypothesis 
Testing 
 
                                                                                                                     Sample    Possible  
Instrument                                                                Mean          SD            Range      Range 
 
 Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS)     
       Time 1 4.44 1.05 2.13-6 1-6 
       Time 2 4.30 .90 2.53-6 1-6 
     
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
Scale (CES-D) 
    
       Time 1 18.51 11.70 0-49 0-60 
       Time 2 17.37 11.51 0-43 0-60 
     
Positive States of Mind (PSOM)     
       Time 1 13.33 3.97 3-18 0-18 
       Time 2 13.14 4.32 3-18 0-18 
     
Positive Reappraisal Coping (PRC)     
       Time 1 12.73 
(3.18) 
2.62 
(.65) 
4-16 4-16 
       Time 2 13.14 
(3.29) 
4.32 
(1.08) 
6-16 4-16 
     
Avoidant Coping     
       Time 1 11.84 3.30 6-20 0-18 
       Time 2 11.77 4.39 6-24 0-18 
 
Note. Due to missing data, N ranged from 71 to 74 at Time 1 and 40 to 43 and Time 2. 
PRC scores presented in parentheses are means of scale scores; both summed scores and 
mean scores are reported for these measures to enable comparison to descriptive data 
from previous studies. 
 
 The means for participant mean scores on the MAAS at Time 1 (M = 4.44, SD = 
1.05) and Time 2 (M = 4.30, SD = .90) were consistent with those found in previous 
studies, including Carlson and Brown‘s 2005 study which found a MAAS mean of 4.08 
(SD = .74) in a population of people diagnosed with cancer. Mean scores on the CES-D at 
Time 1 (M = 18.51, SD = 11.70) and Time 2 (M = 17.37, SD = 11.51) were somewhat 
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higher than those found by Hann, Winter, and Jacobsen (1999), who were also studying a 
population of people diagnosed with cancer; they found CES-D scores that ranged from 
10.9 (SD = 8.9) to 12.8 (SD =10.2). Beeber, Shea, and McCorkle (1998) also found a 
lower CES-D mean (M = 15.69, SD = 9.69) among people diagnosed with cancer, but 
Lieberman et al. (2003) found slightly higher mean on a baseline CES-D survey (M = 
19.2, SD = 4.1) in people diagnosed with cancer. Mean scores on the PSOM measure at 
Time 1 (M = 13.33, SD = 3.97) and Time 2 (M = 13.14, SD = 4.32) were similar to those 
found by Horowitz et al. (1998) in the initial validation of the measure which ranged 
from 11.3 (SD = 3.6) to 12.7 (SD = 3.5). The means of participant mean scores on the 
PRC measure at Time 1 (M = 3.18, SD = .65) and Time 2 (M = 3.29, SD = 1.08) were 
similar to those found by Manne et al. (2004) in a population of women diagnosed with 
breast cancer (M = 2.9, SD = .76). Finally, the mean scores for avoidant coping at Time 1 
(M = 11.84, SD = 3.30) and Time 2 (M = 11.77, SD = 4.39) were similar to scores 
reported by Kershaw et al. (2004) from a study of women diagnosed with cancer. That 
article reported the Brief COPE subscales Self-Distraction (M = 5.70, SD = 1.7), 
Behavioral Disengagement (M = 2.51, SD = 1.1), and Denial (M = 3.04, SD = 1.6) 
separately, but the three sum for a mean of 11.25 which is comparable to our study.  
 Correlations. Pearson correlations were calculated to examine the linear 
relationships among the scales and subscales used in hypothesis testing in the present 
study (see Table 5). Among the variables used in the testing of Hypotheses 1 through 4, 
the Time 1 scale and subscale variables, Mindfulness (MAAS) was shown to have a 
significant negative correlation with depressive symptoms (CES-D, r = -.54, p = <.001) 
as well as with avoidant coping (r = -.39, p = .001). Additionally, Mindfulness was 
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shown to have a significant positive correlation with Positive States of Mind (PSOM, r = 
.66, p = <.001), but no significant correlation with positive reappraisal coping. 
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Table 5 
Correlations Among Scale and Subscale Variables 
 
 
                                                                      1           2              3             4              5            6              7            8             9           10 
 
Mindfulness            
1. MAAS T1 ---          
2. MAAS T2 .65** ---         
           
Depressive Symptoms            
3. CES-D T1 -.54** -.55** ---        
4. CES-D T2 -.46** -.60**   .39* ---       
           
Positive States Of Mind           
5. PSOM T1 .66** .42**  -.63** -.40** ---      
6. PSOM T2 .49** .69**  -.47** -.81** .51** ---     
           
Positive Reappraisal Coping           
7. PRC T1 .12 .21  -.19 .05 .25* .22 ---    
8. PRC T2 .08 .00  -.15 -.14 .35* .14 .40** ---   
           
Avoidant coping           
9. AC T1 -.39** -.29   .41** .53** -.23 -.27 .18 .03 ---  
10. AC T2 -.38** -.50**   .29 .72** -.25 -.60** .10 .20 .67** --- 
 
Note. MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale; PSOM = 
Positive States of Mind; PRC = Positive Reappraisal Coping; AC = Avoidant coping.  
*p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 Among the Time 2 scale scores, Mindfulness (MAAS) correlated to the other 
variables in the same fashion it did with the Time 1 scores. Mindfulness was shown to 
have a significant negative correlation with depressive symptoms (CES-D, r = -.60, p = 
<.001) and with avoidant coping (r = -.50, p = .001). Mindfulness was also shown to have 
a significant positive correlation with positive states of mind (PSOM, r = .69, p = <.001), 
but no significant correlation with positive reappraisal coping. 
When looking at Time 1 and Time 2 scores together, Mindfulness at Time 1 
correlates with Time 2 dependent variables in the same pattern seen above. Mindfulness 
at Time 1 is significantly negatively correlated with depressive symptoms at Time 2 
(CES-D, r = -.46, p = .002) and with avoidant coping at Time 2 (r = -.38, p = .01). And 
Mindfulness at Time 1 is significantly positively correlated with positive states of mind 
(PSOM, r = .49, p = .002), but not significantly correlated with positive reappraisal 
coping. 
 Covariates. Tests were conducted to detect any associations between dependent 
variables (depressive symptoms, positive affect, positive reappraisal coping, and avoidant 
coping) and demographic and illness variables.  
 To determine whether there were differences in any of the dependent variables by 
gender or race/ethnicity, a series of t tests were conducted. At Time 1, there was no 
significant difference between females (M = 17.79, SD = 11.31) and males (M = 20.41, 
SD = 13.23) in depressive symptoms (CES-D), t (71) = -.81, p = .42; no significant 
difference between females (M = 13.76, SD = 3.75) and males (M = 12.06, SD = 4.58) in 
positive states of mind, t (70) = 1.56, p = .12; no significant difference between females 
(M = 12.78, SD = 2.44) and males (M = 12.35, SD = 3.16) in positive reappraisal coping, 
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t (70) = .59, p = .56; and no significant difference between females (M = 11.55, SD = 
3.28) and males (M = 12.53, SD = 3.28) in avoidant coping, t (71) = -1.07, p = .29. At 
Time 2, there was a significant difference between females (M = 15.13, SD = 10.24) and 
males (M = 24.80, SD = 12.86) in depressive symptoms (CES-D), t (41) = -2.47, p = .02, 
a significant difference between females (M = 14.24, SD = 3.61) and males (M = 9.50, SD 
= 4.65) in positive states of mind, t (41) = 3.40, p = .002, and a significant difference 
between females (M = 11.00, SD = 4.30) and males (M = 14.30, SD = 3.86) in avoidant 
coping, t (41) = -2.17, p = .04; however, there was no significant difference between 
females (M = 12.53, SD = 2.90) and males (M = 11.80, SD = 2.53) in positive reappraisal 
coping, t (40) = .72, p = .48. Therefore, gender was retained as a covariate when analyses 
included depressive symptoms, positive states of mind, or avoidant coping.  
For the purposes of this study, race/ethnicity was condensed into ―White‖ and 
―non-White‖ categories because, among the ―non-White‖ group, only two participants 
reported a race other than African American. At Time 1, there was no significant 
difference between non-Whites (M = 17.64, SD = 11.91) and Whites (M = 18.75, SD = 
12.27) in depressive symptoms (CES-D), t (67) = -.36, p = .72; no significant difference 
between non-Whites (M = 13.68, SD = 4.15) and Whites (M = 13.09, SD = 4.03) in 
positive states of mind, t (66) = .57, p = .57; no significant difference between non-
Whites (M = 13.12, SD = 2.39) and Whites (M = 12.52, SD = 2.72) in positive reappraisal 
coping, t (67) = .91, p = .36; and no significant difference between non-Whites (M = 
11.84, SD = 3.22) and Whites (M = 11.61, SD = 3.36) in avoidant coping, t (67) = .27, p 
= .79. This was also the case at Time 2; there was no significant difference between non-
Whites (M = 16.87, SD = 9.90) and Whites (M = 17.04, SD = 12.83) in depressive 
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symptoms (CES-D), t (38) = -.05, p = .96; no significant difference between non-Whites 
(M = 14.00, SD = 3.76) and Whites (M = 12.88, SD = 4.76) in positive states of mind, t 
(38) = .78, p = .44; no significant difference between non-Whites (M = 12.50, SD = 3.16) 
and Whites (M = 12.24, SD = 2.76) in positive reappraisal coping, t (37) = .27, p = .79; 
and no significant difference between  non-Whites (M = 10.20, SD = 2.81) and Whites 
(M = 12.28, SD = 4.82) in avoidant coping, t (38) = -1.52, p = .14. 
 The one categorical variable of interest, stage of cancer at diagnosis, was analyzed 
in relation to each dependent variable using an ANOVA. At Time 1, no significant 
differences were found among groups with different cancer stage diagnoses in depressive 
symptoms (CES-D), F (4, 63) = 1.41, p = .24; positive states of mind, F (4, 62) = .92, p = 
.46; positive reappraisal coping, F (4, 62) = .39 p = .82; or avoidant coping, F (4, 63) = 
.87, p = .49. At Time 2, again, no significant differences were found among groups with 
different cancer stage diagnoses in depressive symptoms (CES-D), F (4, 36) = 1.03, p = 
.41; positive states of mind, F (4, 36) = .91, p = .47; positive reappraisal coping, F (4, 35) 
= .39, p = .82; or avoidant coping, F (4, 36) = .55, p = .70.  
 Pearson correlations were conducted to determine whether age and time since 
diagnosis were significantly associated with any of the dependent variables. Time since 
diagnosis was found to be significantly positively correlated with depressive symptoms 
(CES-D) at Time 1, r = .26, p = .04, and with positive states of mind at Time 1, r = -.30, 
p = .02. No significant correlations were found between time since diagnosis and Time 1 
positive reappraisal coping, r = -.09, p = .47, or Time 1 avoidant coping, r = .07, p = .58. 
And no significant correlations were found between time since diagnosis and Time 2 
depressive symptoms (CES-D), r = .03, p = .84; Time 2 positive states of mind, r = -.17, 
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p = .30; Time 2 positive reappraisal coping, r = -.23, p = .16; or Time 2 avoidant coping, 
r = -.15, p = .37. Additionally, no significant correlations were found between age and 
Time 1 dependent variables (depressive symptoms [CES-D], r = -.01, p = .95; positive 
states of mind, r = -.06 p = .60; positive reappraisal coping, r = -.22, p = .08; avoidant 
coping, r = .08, p = .50) or Time 2 dependent variables (depressive symptoms [CES-D], r 
= .15, p = .34; positive states of mind, r = -.08, p = .62; positive reappraisal coping, r = -
.31, p = .05; avoidant coping, r = .14, p = .38). 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Eight hypotheses were tested using hierarchical multiple linear regression. The 
first four were cross-sectional, using data collected in Time 1 alone, and the last four 
were longitudinal, using data collected at Time 1 and Time 2 of this study.  
Previous literature on mindfulness in a population of people with cancer 
diagnoses showed that higher MAAS scores were related to lower scores on a measure of 
distressed moods (r 
 
= -.39) and that higher MAAS scores were related to lower scores on 
a measure of symptoms of stress (r = -.41; Carlson & Brown, 2005). The effect size for 
these correlations falls in the range offered by Cohen (1992) for a medium effect size (r 
= 0.30 − 0.49), so a medium effect size was also sought for this study. With that in mind, 
for the cross-sectional hypotheses, incorporating three independent variables (one 
predictor and two covariates), with p = .05 and N = 74, the power to detect a medium 
effect size was between .75 and .80. For the longitudinal hypotheses, incorporating four 
predictors (one predictor, the Time 1 measure of the dependent variable, and two 
covariates), with p = .05 and N = 43, the power to detect a medium effect size was 
between .40 and .45. 
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Hypothesis 1. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will account for a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ 
reports of depressive symptoms also at Time 1. Specifically, it is predicted that 
individuals with cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report 
fewer depressive symptoms at Time 1. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 1. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in depressive symptoms at Time 1, while accounting for the covariates gender and time 
since diagnosis. In step one, the covariates were entered into the model. Reports of 
mindfulness at Time 1 were entered in the second step of the model. Results for 
Hypothesis 1 are reported in Table 6. The covariates were not found to be a significant 
predictor of depressive symptoms, ΔF(2, 63) = 2.62 p = .08 (ΔR2 = .08) when entered in 
the first step of the regression. Mindfulness was found to be a significant predictor of 
depressive symptoms, ΔF(1, 62 = 30.39, p = .00 (ΔR2 = .30), accounting for an additional 
30% of variance in the dependent variable. The beta weight for mindfulness (β = -.57) 
indicates an inverse relationship with greater mindfulness predicting fewer depressive 
symptoms. 
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Table 6 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Depressive 
Symptoms (CES-D) at Time 1 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Covariates:  (2, 63) .08 .08 2.62     
Time Since Diagnosis     .68   .31 .27 2.21* 
Gender     3.15 3.64 .11 .87 
         
2. Mindfulness 
(MAAS) 
(1, 62) .38 .30 30.39** -.44   .08 -.57 -5.51** 
 
Note. Gender is coded in data with 1 indicating ―female‖ and 2 indicating ―male.‖  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will account for a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ 
reports of positive moods also at Time 1. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals with 
cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report more positive 
moods at Time 1. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 2. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in positive moods at Time 1, while accounting for the covariates gender and time since 
diagnosis. In step one, the covariates were entered into the model. Reports of mindfulness 
at Time 1 were entered in the second step of the model. Results for Hypothesis 2 are 
reported in Table 7. The covariates were found to be a significant predictor of positive 
moods, ΔF(2, 62) = 4.67, p = .01 (ΔR2 = .13) when entered in the first step of the 
regression. Examination of the beta weights indicates that time since diagnosis (β = -.32) 
was a significant predictor of positive states of mind at Time 2, indicating that a more 
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recent diagnosis was related to having more experiences of positive affect. Mindfulness 
was also found to be a significant predictor of positive moods, ΔF(1, 61) = 61.80, p = 
<.001 (ΔR2 = .44), accounting for an additional 44% of variance in the dependent 
variable. The beta weight for mindfulness (β = .68) indicates a positive relationship, with 
greater mindfulness predicting greater positive states of mind.  
Table 7 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Positive States of 
Mind (PSOM) at Time 1 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Covariates: (2, 62) .13 .13 4.67*     
Time Since Diagnosis     -.27   .10 -.32 -2.72** 
Gender     -2.05 1.16 -.21 -1.76 
         
2. Mindfulness 
(MAAS) 
(1, 61) .57 .44 61.80** .17   .02 .68 7.86** 
 
Note. Gender is coded in data with 1 indicating ―female‖ and 2 indicating ―male.‖  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will account for a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ 
reports of positive reappraisal also at Time 1. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals 
with cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report more positive 
reappraisal at Time 1. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 3. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in positive reappraisal at Time 1. Reports of mindfulness at Time 1 were entered into the 
model. Results for Hypothesis 3 are reported in Table 8. Mindfulness did not account for 
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a significant amount of the variance in positive reappraisal at Time 1, ΔF(1, 71) = 1.00, p 
= .32 (ΔR2 = .01). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported by the data. 
Table 8 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Positive 
Reappraisal Coping (PRC) at Time 1 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Mindfulness 
(MAAS) 
(1, 71) .01 .01 1.00 .02 .02 .12 1.00 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will account for a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ 
reports of avoidant coping also at Time 1. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals 
with cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report less avoidant 
coping at Time 1. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 4. A linear regression analysis was conducted to 
determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance in avoidant 
coping at Time 1, while accounting for the covariate gender. In step one, gender was 
entered into the model. Reports of mindfulness at Time 1 were entered in the second step 
of the model. Results for Hypothesis 4 are reported in Table 9. Gender was not found to 
be a significant predictor of avoidant coping, ΔF(1, 71) = 1.15, p = .29 (ΔR2 = .02) when 
entered in the first step of the regression. Mindfulness was found to be a significant 
predictor of avoidant coping when entered in the second step of the model, ΔF(1, 70) =  
11.63, p = .00 (ΔR2 = .14), with mindfulness accounting for 14% of the variance in 
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avoidant coping. The beta weight for mindfulness (β = -.37) indicates an inverse 
relationship, with greater mindfulness predicting less avoidant coping. 
Table 9 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Avoidant Coping at 
Time 1 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Covariate: 
Gender 
(1, 71) .02 .02 1.15 .98 .91 .13 1.07 
         
2. Mindfulness 
(MAAS) 
(1, 70) .16 .14 11.63** -.08 .02 -.37 -3.41** 
 
Note. Gender is coded in data with 1 indicating ―female‖ and 2 indicating ―male.‖  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 Hypothesis 5. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will predict a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ reports 
of depressive symptoms at Time 2 (3 months later), when the variance from depressive 
symptoms at Time 1 is controlled for. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals with 
cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report fewer depressive 
symptoms at Time 2, after accounting for depressive symptoms at Time 1. Additionally, 
mindfulness at Time 1 will have a stronger relationship to depressive symptoms at Time 
2 than mindfulness at Time 2 has to depression symptoms at Time 1, demonstrating the 
role mindfulness plays in causing variance in depression symptoms. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 5. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in depressive symptoms at Time 2, while accounting for depressive symptoms at Time 1 
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and the covariates gender and time since diagnosis. In step one, depressive symptoms at 
Time 1 were entered into the model. In step two, gender and time since diagnosis were 
entered into the model. And reports of mindfulness at Time 1 were entered in the third 
step of the model. Results for Hypothesis 5 are reported in Table 10. Depressive 
symptoms at Time 1 was found be a significant predictor of depressive symptoms at 
Time 2, ΔF(1, 38) = 11.08, p = .00 (ΔR2 = .23) when entered in the first step of the 
regression. The beta weight for depressive symptoms at Time 1 (β = .48) indicates a 
positive relationship with depressive symptoms at Time 2. The covariates were found to 
add significantly to the prediction of depressive symptoms at Time 2, ΔF(2, 36) = 3.60, p 
= .04 (ΔR2 = .13) when entered in the second step of the regression. Examination of the 
beta weights indicates gender (β = .36) was a significant predictor of depressive 
symptoms at Time 2, with the male participants demonstrating higher levels of depressive 
symptoms. Finally, in step three, Mindfulness at Time 1 did not account for a significant 
portion of additional variance in depressive symptoms at Time 2, ΔF(1, 35) =  2.01, p = 
.17 (ΔR2 = .04).  
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Table 10 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Depressive 
Symptoms (CES-D) at Time 2 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Control: (CES-D 
T1) 
(1, 38) .23 .23 11.08** .48 .14 .48 3.33** 
         
2. Covariates:  (2, 36) .36 .13 3.60*     
Time Since Diagnosis     -.16   .38 -.06 -.41 
Gender     10.42 4.15 .36 2.51* 
         
3. Mindfulness 
(MAAS T1) 
(1, 35) .39 .04 2.01  -.17   .12 -.23 -1.42 
 
Note. Gender is coded in data with 1 indicating ―female‖ and 2 indicating ―male.‖  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Additional examination of the set of 6 correlations formed among mindfulness at 
Time 1, mindfulness at Time 2, depressive symptoms at Time 1 and depressive 
symptoms at Time 2 was conducted using cross-lagged analysis. Among the uses for 
cross-lagged analysis cited by Rughunathan, Rosenthal, and Rubin (1996) is ―comparing 
the correlation between a current measure and a different future measure with a 
correlation between a different current measure and a future measure.‖ The comparison 
of mindfulness and depressive symptoms across two time points matches this scenario, 
making cross-lagged analysis an appropriate addition to the regression analyses used in 
this study.  
When a set of four variables is intercorrelated, as in the present study, six 
correlations are produced, and any two can be compared. Importantly, there are two types 
of correlation comparisons, overlapping and nonoverlapping. The overlapping type 
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occurs when the pair of correlations are generated by a common variable. 
Nonoverlapping comparisons are made with correlations that have no common variables 
(Rughunathan et al., 1996). In this instance, an example of an overlapping correlation is 
the relationship between mindfulness and Time 1 and depressive symptoms at Time 1; 
they ―overlap‖ due to a shared time point. Similarly, the relationship between 
mindfulness at Time 1 and mindfulness at Time 2 is an overlapping correlation because 
the measure is the same in both instances. The nonoverlapping correlations are the 
relationship between mindfulness at Time 1 and depressive symptoms at Time 2 as well 
as the relationship between mindfulness at Time 2 and depressive symptoms at Time 1 – 
neither of these combinations share the same time point or the same measure.  
Cross-lagged analysis allows for the comparison of these two nonoverlapping 
correlations, by using any significant difference between the two to assess potential 
causal relationships (Rughunathan, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1996.) The overlapping 
correlations can be examined directly for their difference in magnitude, if that difference 
is found to be significant through use of the Pearson-Filon test statistic (Pearson & Filon, 
1989) or a variation preferred by Rughunathan et al., the ZPF, which incorporates the 
Fisher Z transformation of correlation coefficients. 
 (1) 
where 
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(2) 
In these equations, the set of six correlations are notated using r12, r13, r14, r23, r24, 
r34, where the nonoverlapping correlations are r14 and r23. ―Aapprox‖ is an adjustment 
factor which helps us understand if the difference between the nonoverlapping 
correlations is significant, and it is calculated using all six correlations in the set. Z14 and 
Z23 are transformations of r14 and r23, calculated using Fisher‘s Z. 
 Examination of the correlations between mindfulness at Time 1, mindfulness at 
Time 2, depressive symptoms at Time 1, and depressive symptoms at Time 2 generated a 
test statistic (ZPF value) larger than any of the differences between correlations (ZFP = 
.58), indicating that there are no significant differences between correlations. In other 
words, the raw difference between the correlation between mindfulness at Time 1 and 
depressive symptoms at Time 2 and the correlation between mindfulness at Time 2 and 
depressive symptoms at Time 1 (our two nonoverlapping correlations), was not 
significant because it did not exceed the ZPF value. (See Appendix F.) Without a 
significant difference between these correlations we are not able to infer a causal 
relationship between mindfulness at Time 1 and depressive symptoms at Time 2, as was 
hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 6. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will predict a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ reports 
of positive states of mind at Time 2 (3 months later), when the variance from positive 
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states of mind at Time 1 is controlled for. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals 
with cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report higher 
positive states of mind at Time 2, after accounting for positive states of mind at Time 1. 
Additionally, mindfulness at Time 1 will have a stronger relationship to positive states of 
mind at Time 2 than mindfulness at Time 2 has to positive states of mind at Time 1, 
demonstrating the role mindfulness plays in causing variance in positive states of mind. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 6. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in positive states of mind at Time 2, while accounting for positive states of mind at Time 
1 and the covariates gender and time since diagnosis. In step one, positive states of mind 
at Time 1 were entered into the model. In step two, the covariates were entered into the 
model. And reports of mindfulness at Time 1 were entered in the third step of the model. 
Results for Hypothesis 6 are reported in Table 11. Positive states of mind at Time 1 was 
found be a significant predictor of depressive symptoms at Time 2, ΔF(1, 37) = 18.57, p 
= .00 (ΔR2 = .33) when entered in the first step of the regression. Examination of the beta 
weight for positive states of mind at Time 1 (β = .58) indicates a positive relationship 
with positive states of mind at Time 2. The covariates were not found to add significantly 
to the prediction of positive states of mind at Time 2, ΔF(2, 35) = 2.57, p = .09 (ΔR2 = 
.09) when entered in the second step of the regression. Finally, in step three, Mindfulness 
at Time 1 did not account for a significant portion of additional variance in positive states 
of mind at Time 2, ΔF(1, 34) = .72, p = .40 (ΔR2 = .01).  
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Table 11 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Positive States of 
Mind (PSOM) at Time 2 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Control: (PSOM 
T1) 
(1, 37) .33 .33 18.57** .59 .14 .58 4.31** 
         
2. Covariates:  (2, 35) .42 .09 2.57     
Time Since Diagnosis     -.05   .14 -.05 -.39 
Gender     -3.48 1.54 -.33 -2.26* 
         
3. Mindfulness 
(MAAS T1) 
(1, 34) .43 .01 .72 .04   .05 .15 .85 
 
Note. Gender is coded in data with 1 indicating ―female‖ and 2 indicating ―male.‖ 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 Examination of the correlations between mindfulness at Time 1, mindfulness at 
Time 2, positive states of mind at Time 1, and positive states of mind at Time 2 generated 
a test statistic larger than any of the differences between correlations (ZFP = .47), 
indicating that there are no significant differences between correlations and causation 
cannot be inferred. (See Appendix F.) 
Hypothesis 7. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will predict a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ reports 
of positive reappraisal coping at Time 2 (3 months later), when the variance from positive 
reappraisal coping at Time 1 is controlled for. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals 
with cancer who report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will also report higher 
positive reappraisal coping at Time 2, after accounting for positive reappraisal coping at 
Time 1. Additionally, mindfulness at Time 1 will have a stronger relationship to positive 
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reappraisal coping at Time 2 than mindfulness at Time 2 has to positive reappraisal 
coping at Time 1, demonstrating the role mindfulness plays in causing variance in 
positive reappraisal coping. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 7. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in positive reappraisal coping at Time 2, while accounting for positive reappraisal coping 
at Time 1. In step one, positive reappraisal coping at Time 1 was entered into the model. 
In step two, reports of mindfulness at Time 1 were entered into the model. Results for 
Hypothesis 7 are reported in Table 12. positive reappraisal coping at Time 1 was found 
be a significant predictor of positive reappraisal coping at Time 2, ΔF(1, 39) = 7.49, p = 
.01 (ΔR2 = .16) when entered in the first step of the regression. Examination of the beta 
weight for positive reappraisal coping at Time 1 (β = .40) indicated a positive relationship 
with positive reappraisal coping at Time 2. Entered in Step 2, Mindfulness at Time 1 did 
not account for a significant portion of additional variance in positive reappraisal coping 
at Time 2, ΔF(1, 38) = .09, p = .76 (ΔR2 = .00).  
Table 12 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Positive 
Reappraisal Coping (PRC) at Time 2 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Control: (PRC 
T1) 
(1, 39) .16 .16 7.49** .44 .16 .40 2.74** 
         
2. Mindfulness 
(MAAS T1) 
(1, 38) .16 .00 .09 .01 .03 .05 .31 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 62 
 
 Examination of the correlations between mindfulness at Time 1, mindfulness at 
Time 2, positive reappraisal coping at Time 1, and positive reappraisal coping at Time 2 
generated a test statistic larger than any of the differences between correlations (ZFP = 
.65), indicating that there are no significant differences between correlations and 
causation cannot be inferred. (See Appendix F.) 
Hypothesis 8. Mindfulness demonstrated by individuals recently diagnosed with 
cancer at Time 1 will predict a significant amount of the variance in participants‘ reports 
of avoidant coping at Time 2 (3 months later), when the variance from avoidant coping at 
Time 1 is controlled for. Specifically, it is predicted that individuals with cancer who 
report having more mindfulness at Time 1 will report lower avoidant coping at Time 2, 
after accounting for avoidant coping at Time 1. Additionally, mindfulness at Time 1 will 
have a stronger relationship to avoidant coping at Time 2 than mindfulness at Time 2 has 
to avoidant coping at Time 1, demonstrating the role mindfulness plays in causing 
variance in avoidant coping. 
Analysis of Hypothesis 8. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was 
conducted to determine how much mindfulness at Time 1 predicts the amount of variance 
in avoidant coping at Time 2, while accounting for avoidant coping at Time 1 and the 
covariate gender. In step one, avoidant coping at Time 1 was entered into the model. In 
step two, gender was entered into the model. And reports of mindfulness at Time 1 were 
entered in the third step of the model. Results for Hypothesis 8 are reported in Table 13. 
Avoidant coping at Time 1 was found be a significant predictor of avoidant coping at 
Time 2, ΔF(1, 41) = 32.56, p = .00 (ΔR2 = .44) when entered in the first step of the 
regression. The beta weight for avoidant coping at Time 1 (β = .67) indicated a positive 
 63 
 
relationship with avoidant coping at Time 2.  Gender was also found to add significantly 
to the prediction of avoidant coping at Time 2, ΔF(1, 40) = 5.44, p = .03 (ΔR2 = .07) 
when entered in the second step of the regression. Examination of the beta weights for 
gender (β  = .26) indicated that male participants demonstrated higher levels of avoidant 
coping. Finally, in step three, mindfulness at Time 1 did not account for a significant 
portion of additional variance in avoidant coping at Time 2, ΔF(1, 39) = .34, p = .57 (ΔR2 
= .00).  
Table 13 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression Model for the Prediction of Avoidant Coping 
(Avoid) at Time 2 from Mindfulness at Time 1 
 
 
Step and variable              df          R
2        ΔR2        ΔF            B         SE B        β              t 
 
1. Control: (Avoid 
T1) 
(1, 41) .44 .44 32.56** .84 .15 .67 5.71** 
         
2. Covariate: 
Gender 
(1, 40) .51 .07 5.44* 2.67 1.14 .26 2.33* 
         
2. Mindfulness 
(MAAS T1) 
(1, 39) .51 .00 .34 -.02 .04 -.07 -.58 
 
Note. Gender is coded in data with 1 indicating ―female‖ and 2 indicating ―male.‖ 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 Examination of the correlations between mindfulness at Time 1, mindfulness at 
Time 2, avoidant coping at Time 1, and avoidant coping at Time 2 generated a test 
statistic larger than any of the differences between correlations (ZFP = .56), indicating 
that there are no significant differences between correlations and causation cannot be 
inferred. (See Appendix F.) 
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Discussion 
 
 The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between dispositional 
mindfulness and measures of depressive symptoms and well-being in people recently 
diagnosed with cancer.  In this chapter, the results of the study will be summarized and 
compared to previous studies. The possible meanings of this study‘s findings will be 
explored along with limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research.  
Summary of findings 
 Hypotheses 1 through 4 proposed that variance in a dependent variable, 
depressive symptoms, positive affect, positive reappraisal coping, or avoidant coping, at a 
single time point could be accounted for by levels of mindfulness, as measured by the 
MAAS, in a population of people recently diagnosed with cancer.  
 Mindfulness was found to predict depressive symptoms and avoidant coping, with 
greater mindfulness related to fewer depressive symptoms and less avoidant coping; and 
mindfulness was found to predict greater positive affect, with greater mindfulness related 
to more experiences of positive affect. This finding is convergent with the emerging body 
of literature on mindfulness which indicates that higher levels of mindfulness are related 
to better outcomes on measures that reflect well-being and, specifically, that more 
mindful individuals are likely to use more effective methods of coping with stress (e.g., 
Argus & Thompson, 2007; Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan, 2009; Zvolensky et al., 2006).  
 The findings in the current study are similar to those outlined in Weinstein, 
Brown, and Ryan‘s 2009 article, which included four separate studies of mindfulness, 
well-being, and coping methods in undergraduate students who experienced stress either 
in a controlled laboratory setting or in the naturalistic environment of a college course. In 
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that article, the authors reported that higher levels of mindfulness predicted better well-
being outcomes and less use of avoidant coping styles, as is the case with the current 
study‘s participants, who were experiencing the stress of cancer diagnosis and treatment. 
Similarly, Zvolensky et al. (2009) found the mindfulness, as measured by the MAAS, 
was positively associated with positive affectivity and negatively associated with 
depressive symptoms. In this way, the current study extends previous findings on the 
relationship between mindfulness and measures of well-being to a naturalistic health 
stressor experienced by millions of people. 
 Weinstein, Brown, and Ryan (2009) also measured the participants‘ perceptions 
of day-to-day experiences as stressful, and found that more mindful individuals were less 
likely to report having stressful experiences. The authors also found that experiencing 
less stress was related to less use of avoidant coping strategies, greater use of adaptive 
coping methods, and experiences of higher well-being. Though the current study did not 
measure experiences of stress, the similar outcomes on measures of well-being and 
avoidant coping suggest that more mindful participants may experience less stress from 
cancer diagnosis and treatment leading to better day-to-day affect, less use of avoidant 
coping, and, in the end, fewer depressive symptoms.  
 The Weinstein, Brown, and Ryan (2009) study also showed greater use of positive 
coping strategies in people with higher levels of mindfulness, a finding that was not born 
out in the present study, as higher levels of positive reappraisal coping were not found to 
be predicted by higher levels of mindfulness. The 4-item measure of positive reappraisal 
coping, which is a subscale of Carver et al.‘s (1989) COPE, may not have adequately 
evaluated positive coping strategies. Interestingly, while the other dependent variables in 
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the study showed a pattern of significant correlations to each other and to the MAAS, 
positive reappraisal coping did not have a consistent pattern of significant correlations. 
Additionally, of the scales used in this study, positive reappraisal coping had a relatively 
low level of internal consistency (alpha = .68) at Time 1. With this in mind, it is likely 
that the positive reappraisal coping measure used in this study did not consistently 
measure what it was intended to. Future studies might consider using a different measure 
to investigate efforts at positive reappraisal coping, or positive coping generally. 
 Hypotheses 5 through 8 proposed that variance in a dependent variable at a 
second time point could be accounted for by levels of mindfulness at the first time point, 
after accounting for the dependent variable at Time 1 and any demographic or illness 
covariates. However, mindfulness at Time 1 was not found to predict any of the 
dependent variables at Time 2. Additionally, a cross-lagged analysis was conducted using 
the four scale variables in Hypotheses 5 through 8 to look for causal relationships 
between mindfulness at Time 1 and the dependent variables at Time 2. No causal 
relationships were found through cross-lagged analysis.  
 Despite the lack of significant hypothesized findings among the longitudinal 
analyses, exploratory analysis of the data did reveal that mindfulness at Time 1 correlated 
with depressive symptoms, positive affect, and avoidant coping variables measured at 
Time 2; mindfulness at Time 1 had a significant inverse correlation with depressive 
symptoms at Time 2 and avoidant coping at Time 2 and a significant positive correlation 
with positive affect at Time 2. 
 Study limitations that may be related to the lack of significant findings for 
Hypotheses 5 through 8 are explored below. 
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Limitations 
 The failure to obtain the expected results in the longitudinal hypothesis, as well as 
in the investigation of cross-lagged correlations, could be due to a number of 
methodological issues.  
 First, the size of the Time 2 sample (N = 43) was smaller than what would be 
desired for appropriate statistical power; the power for the longitudinal regression 
analyses was calculated to be between .40 and .45. The low power could have caused us 
to make a Type II error, failing to detect an association when there truly was one in the 
population, which would have made evidence of the role of mindfulness undetectable. 
The small Time 2 sample was caused in part by failure of participants to return Time 2 
packets in the mail 3 months after being enrolled in the study, despite being contacted by 
phone with reminders. It may have been more efficient for participants to complete the 
surveys in an online format; however, this mechanism may have eliminated some of the 
socio-economic diversity from the study. 
 Second, the time at which participants were first surveyed, up to 12 months 
following diagnosis, paired with the interval between the Time 1 and Time 2 measures, 
may have resulted in measures that ―missed‖ the hypothesized phenomenon. For 
example, if a person was diagnosed with cancer 6 months before completing the Time 1 
survey, he or she may have already experienced the ―change‖ in well-being that this 
study aimed to quantify. In that case, by accounting for dependent variables at Time 1 in 
the longitudinal regression analyses, evidence of the change over time would be lost. 
Evidence of the strong correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 dependent variables 
furthers this argument.  
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In addition to concern about the timing of the first survey, the timing of the Time 
2 measure 3 months after the first may not have been appropriate for capturing change 
that took place after Time 1, especially in the longitudinal hypotheses where we were 
looking for change in well-being variables that could be attributed to variations in 
mindfulness at Time 1. Similar studies going forward should consider incorporating more 
time points at 6, 9, and 12 months after diagnosis which would improve the likelihood of 
finding any change in well-being indicators that exists in the population and the 
likelihood of pin-pointing when that change takes place.  
In preliminary analyses of the data, we found that Time 1 dependent variables 
were highly correlated with Time 1 mindfulness, flagging a potential problem with 
multicollinearity, which can cause miscalculations in the role of individual predictors in 
regression analysis. For example, because depressive symptoms at Time 1 was highly 
correlated (r = -.54, p = .00) with mindfulness at Time 1, we may not have been 
accurately able to separate the predictive ability of these two variables (though the overall 
predictive ability of the model would not be affected). A traditional fix to a problem with 
multicollinearity is to combine highly correlated variables. However, for the purposes of 
this study, it was important to evaluate the dependent variables at Time 1 and 
mindfulness at Time 1 separately, so that we could examine the role of mindfulness in 
predicting a change in the dependent variable from Time 1 to Time 2. Therefore, the 
decision was made to leave unaddressed the potential multicollinearity problem.  
 Another source of concern in this study is the variability of illness factors, such as 
type of cancer diagnosis, stage of cancer diagnosis, type of treatment, and time since 
diagnosis, among participants. Because there were a variety of illness profiles among the 
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participants, but insufficient sample size to group participants by, for example, type of 
cancer or stage of cancer, experiences of being diagnosed with cancer may have varied in 
important ways without being accounted for. That said, all the participants faced a life 
threatening diagnosis, were asked to make challenging choices about their treatment, and 
were exposed to the stress of cancer treatment, so there was likely significant 
commonality to their experiences. And, by examining correlations between dependent 
variables and the covariates time since diagnosis and stage of cancer, we know there were 
either no significant differences between participants grouped by these variables or were 
able to account for them in the regression analyses. 
Implications 
 Despite methodological challenges, this study produced fascinating significant 
results among the cross-sectional hypothesis. The role of mindfulness in accounting for 
variability in depressive symptoms, positive states of mind, and avoidant coping at a 
single time point is significant and supports the theory that people who have higher levels 
of mindfulness may be better able to cope with stressful life events like cancer. 
Additionally, knowing the demonstrated ability of training in mindfulness to improve 
dispositional mindfulness as measured by the MAAS, it may be highly beneficial for 
people diagnosed with cancer, or experiencing other stressful life events, to receive 
mindfulness training. 
Future directions 
 As described above, similar studies being planned to examine the relationship 
between mindfulness and measures of well-being in people diagnosed with cancer should 
involve a larger sample of participants, should first measure participants at a standardized 
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time point closer to diagnosis than ―up to 12 months,‖ and should measure participants at 
least three separate times at intervals of no more than 3 months. Additionally, logistical 
considerations should be explored to account for the tendency of participants to drop out 
of the study after the first time point. For example, it may be more efficient to conduct 
this type of research through internet surveys.  
 Researchers might also consider using different measures of well-being in future 
studies. Additional information about well-being could be provided through measures of 
anxiety symptoms and engagement in pleasurable activities, tracking of behaviors such as 
sleep, diet, substance use, and even reports of participant affect provided by friends and 
family members. Other methods of data collection, such as structured interview, might be 
considered to eliminate concerns about participant self-report of affective experiences. 
And health information, such as type of cancer and stage of cancer, might be better 
collected from participant medical records rather than by participant report. 
 As shown in the Weinstein, Brown, and Ryan 2009 article, participant 
experiences of stress seem to be an intermediate factor between mindfulness and well-
being, with people high in mindfulness experiencing less stress and, in turn, maintaining 
higher levels of well-being. So, it would be prudent for future studies to examine the role 
of stress, in particular because it may be a better short-term indicator of the positive 
influence of being mindful and therefore more likely to be significantly predicted by 
variations in mindfulness. 
 Given the historical and theoretical associations between mindfulness and 
religious and spiritual practices, it would be interesting to collect information about the 
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type and quantity of participants‘ religious and spiritual practices both during their 
lifetimes and in the days and months following their diagnoses with cancer.  
 Finally, it would be ideal to have information about participants‘ levels of 
mindfulness and well-being prior to their diagnoses of cancer. Of course, it is impossible 
to know who will be diagnosed with cancer, so this type of measurement would need to 
be collected in the context of an extremely large longitudinal study, such as the Nurses‘ 
Health Study, which was started in 1976 and has 238,000 participants (Nurses‘ Health 
Study website, 2011). Having premorbid information about mindfulness and well-being 
would make measuring the effects of a stressful event, like diagnosis with cancer, much 
more efficient.  
Conclusion 
 This study of the relationship between mindfulness, depressive symptoms, and 
well-being in people diagnosed with cancer showed that mindfulness predicts lower 
scores on measures of depressive symptoms and avoidant coping and higher scores on a 
measure of positive affect at a single time point. The study failed to show that 
mindfulness predicts well-being over time, but demonstrated significant correlations 
between mindfulness and subsequent measures of well-being. Methodological 
limitations, such as small sample size and survey timing, likely contributed to the lack of 
statistically significant results and could be eliminated in future studies. 
 Overall, this study supports previous findings that higher levels of mindfulness 
predict higher levels of well-being when individuals are under stress. The study 
contributes to evidence suggesting that intentional gains in mindfulness can be beneficial 
to the well-being of people experiencing stress. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) 
 
 
Instructions: Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using 
the 1-6 scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have 
each experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather 
than what you think your experiences should be. Please treat each item separately from 
every other item.  
 
1 
Almost 
Always 
2 
Very 
Frequently 
3 
Somewhat 
Frequently 
4 
Somewhat 
Infrequently 
5 
Very  
Infrequently 
6 
Almost 
Never 
 
I could be experiencing some emotion and not be 
conscious of it until sometime later…………………… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I break or spill things because of carelessness, not 
paying attention, or thinking of something else……… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I find it difficult to stay focused on what‘s happening 
in the present…………………………………………. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I tend to walk quickly to get to where I‘m going 
without paying attention to what I experience along the 
way…… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or 
discomfort until they really grab my attention……… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I forget a person‘s name almost as soon as I‘ve been 
told it the first time…………………………………… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
It seems I am ―running on automatic,‖ without much 
awareness of what I‘m doing………………………… 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I rush through activities without being really attentive 
to them………………………………………………. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I 
lose touch with what I am doing to get there………….. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware 
of what I‘m doing…………………………………. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing 
something else at the same time………………………. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I drive places on ‗automatic pilot‘ and then wonder 
why I went there…………………………………….. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I find myself preoccupied with past or future………... 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I find myself doing things without paying attention…. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I snack without being aware that I am eating………… 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
 
 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please circle the number that best describes how 
often you felt or behaved this way – DURING THE PAST WEEK. 
 
 
X     
DURING THE PAST WEEK: 
0  
Rarely or 
None of 
the 
Time  
(Less than 
1 Day) 
 
 
 
1 
Some or a 
Little of 
the Time            
(1-2 Days) 
 
 
 
 
2 
Occasionally 
or a 
Moderate 
Amount of 
Time 
(3-4 Days) 
 
 
3 
Most or All 
of the 
Time 
(5-7 Days) 
 
 
 
 I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me.  0 1 2 3 
I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with 
help from my family or friends. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I felt that I was just as good as other people. . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. . 0 1 2 3 
I felt depressed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
I felt that everything I did was an effort. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I felt hopeful about the future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
I thought my life had been a failure. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
I felt fearful. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
My sleep was restless. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
I was happy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I talked less than usual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Positive States of Mind (PSOM) 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire is about the kinds of satisfying states of mind that you may have experienced IN 
THE LAST 7 DAYS.  In the space to the left of each item please circle the number that coincides 
with the best description of your experience. 
 
 
 
0  
Unable to 
have it 
 
 
 
 
1 
Trouble in  
having it 
 
 
 
2  
Limited in 
having it 
 
 
3 
Have it 
well 
 
 
Focused Attention:  Feeling able to attend to 
a task you want or need to do, without 
many distractions from within yourself. 0 1 2 3 
Productivity:  Feeling of being able to stay at 
work until a task is finished, do something 
new to solve problems, or express yourself 
creatively. 0 1 2 3 
Responsible Caretaking:  Feeling that you 
are doing what you should do to take care 
0 1 2 3 
I felt lonely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
People were unfriendly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I enjoyed life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 1 2 3 
I had crying spells. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I felt sad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I felt that people disliked me. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
I could not get "going". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 
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of yourself or someone else. 
Restful Repose:  Feeling relaxed, without 
distractions or excessive tension. 0 1 2 3 
Sensuous Nonsexual Pleasure:  Being able 
to enjoy bodily senses, enjoyable 
intellectual activity, doing things you 
ordinarily like, such as listening to music, 
enjoying the outdoors, lounging in a hot 
bath. 0 1 2 3 
Sharing:  Being able to commune with others 
in an empathetic, close way, as in talking, 
walking, going out, or just being together. 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix D 
 
 
Cope Inventory (Modified) 
 
 
 
 
These items deal with ways you've been coping with the stress in your life related to your experience 
with cancer.  Each item asks what you’ve been doing to cope.  Don't answer on the basis of whether a 
particular way of coping seems to be working or not—just whether or not you're doing it.  Make your 
answers as true FOR YOU as you can. 
 
For each statement, please circle the number that best describes how much or how frequently 
you have done what the item says, to deal with your experience with cancer. 
 
       
1  
I don't 
do this at 
all 
 
 
 
2 
I do this a 
little bit 
 
 
3  
I do this a 
medium 
amount 
 
4 
I do this        
a lot 
 
 
I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. 1 2 3 4 
I take the time to figure out what I'm really feeling. 1 2 3 4 
I turn to work or other activities to take my mind off things. 1 2 3 4 
I take time to express my emotions. 1 2 3 4 
I say to myself "this isn't real." 1 2 3 4 
I delve into my feelings to get a thorough understanding of 
them. 1 2 3 4 
I give up trying to deal with it. 1 2 3 4 
I let my feelings come out freely. 1 2 3 4 
I refuse to believe that it has happened. 1 2 3 4 
I realize that my feelings are valid and important. 1 2 3 4 
I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 1 2 3 4 
I allow myself to express my emotions.  1 2 3 4 
I give up the attempt to cope.  1 2 3 4 
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I acknowledge my emotions. 1 2 3 4 
I look for something good in what is happening. 1 2 3 4 
I feel free to express my emotions. 1 2 3 4 
I do something to think about it less, such as going to movies, 
or watching TV, reading, daydreaming, sleeping, or shopping. 1 2 3 4 
I learn something from the experience. 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Demographic and Disease Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
In this last section, please answer these questions about your background.  All responses 
are confidential. 
 
 
1. What is your gender?  
 Female  
  Male 
 
2.  When were you born? 
 Month: __________    Year: _________  
 
3. What is your racial/ethnic background?  (Check all that apply) 
   African American (Black) 
   Caucasian (White) 
   Asian/Pacific Islander 
   Hispanic/Latino/Latina 
   American Indian 
   Other (specify) ___________________________ 
 
4. How much school did you complete?  (Check one only) 
   Elementary or middle school 
   Some high school 
  High school graduate or GED 
   Some college 
   College graduate 
   Some graduate school 
   Graduate/professional degree 
   Other: ___________________ 
 
5. What is your relationship status? 
  Married 
  Partnered or in a significant relationship  
  Separated 
  Divorced 
 88 
 
 Widowed 
  Single 
 
6. Are you currently employed? 
   Yes    If yes, do you work: 
 Full-time? 
 Part-time? 
  No 
  Retired  
 
 
7.  Which of the following categories best describes your annual household income from all  sources before 
taxes? 
 
  Less than $20,000   $40,001-$60,000   $80,001-$100,000  
 $20,001-$40,000   $60,001-$80,000   Greater than $100,000 
 
8.  What are your current living arrangements?  (Check all that apply) 
 Live alone 
 Live with spouse/partner 
 Live with my children 
 Live with other family members 
 Live with non-family members  
 
9.  Do you currently have any pets living in your household?  (Please check all that apply)  
  No pets in household    Please skip question 10. 
   Dog      
   Cat 
   Bird 
   Fish 
   Other pets 
 
10.  (If you have a pet in your household):  Does having a pet help you to deal with your illness? 
 Not at all helpful 
 Slightly helpful 
 Fairly helpful 
 Very helpful  
 
11. What was the date of your cancer diagnosis? 
 
Month: __________    Year: _________ 
 
12. What type of cancer were you diagnosed with? (e.g., breast cancer, colon cancer) 
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_________________________________________________ 
 
13. When you were diagnosed with cancer, what was the stage of your disease? 
 
 Stage I 
 Stage II 
 Stage III 
 Stage IV 
 Uncertain 
 
 
14. What type of treatment have you received for your cancer? (Check all that apply) 
 
 Surgery 
 Chemotherapy 
 Radiation 
 Other (specify):  __________________________ 
 No treatment     Please skip question 15. 
 
15. (If you have received cancer treatment):  Have you finished treatment? 
 
 Yes 
 Date treatment was finished:  Month: __________    Year: _________ 
 No, my treatment is not finished. 
 Uncertain 
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Appendix F 
 
 
Calculations for Cross-Lagged Analysis 
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Hypothesis 5: MAAS and CES-D
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Hypothesis 6: MAAS and PSOM
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Hypothesis 7: MAAS and PRC
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Hypothesis 8: MAAS and Avoidant Coping
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